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The Louisiana Criminal Code
A COMPARISON WITH PRIOR LOUISIANA CRIMINAL LAW
DALE

E. BENNETT*

Enactment of the new "Louisiana Criminal Code"' marks an
important transition in the criminal law of the state-a transition
from a hybrid system of partially "written" and partially "unwritten" law to a. complete system of written law which is in
keeping with Louisiana's foremost position in the field of codification. A brief restatement of the objects which guided the Louisiana State Law Institute and its Reporters is significant and necessary for a complete understanding of the Code. The fundamental
principles of present Louisiana criminal law were to be codified
wherever such principles were sound and practicable, thus preserving the invaluable heritage of past jurisprudence and experience. Changes were not to be made, merely for the sake of
change; and untried, largely theoretical, penal innovations were
to be avoided. However, the Institute was charged with the preparation of a "Code" in the full civilian sense of the word, and
not with a mere compilation of existing statutes. Thus wherever
obsolete fictions and obtuse distinctions existed in the present
law, such fictions and distinctions were to be eliminated. Where
past jurisprudence indicated gaps or hiatuses in existing criminal
statutes, the articles of the new Code were to be drafted so as to
plug up those gaps and hiatuses. Where a change was clearly
necessary and practical, a century of habitual error should not
preclude its adoption. Such must be the modus operandi if the
new Code was to be worthy to serve as a pattern for other jurisdictions interested in the codification and improvement of their
criminal law. A number of important changes were made, but in
each case the change was preceded by a full consideration of the
policies and practical issues involved. An equal number of
changes, tentatively proposed by the Reporters, were rejected by
the advisory group and Council of the Institute as being unnecesActing Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School; one of the Louisiana State Law Institute Reporters who did
the preliminary drafting of the Code and comments thereto.
1. La. Act 43 of 1942. Article 1 expressly authorizes a short method of
citation as the "Louisiana Criminal Code."
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sary, or on the ground that the innovation suggested was of more
theoretical than practical merit. Thus the Code presented to, and
adopted by, the Louisiana legislature represents a sound compromise of the sometimes over-theoretical attitude of the law professor with the sometimes over-conservative attitude of the practitioner.
The new Criminal Code should be of special help to the young
lawyer who has not yet had time to master the intricacies of our
present system, with its numerous over-lapping and sometimes
conflicting statutes superimposed upon a basic system of common
law crimes. General principles of culpability, justification and excuse are specifically covered by codal articles, where formerly
Louisiana jurists and lawyers were relegated entirely to the unwritten precedents of the English common law. Many of the
meaningless fictions and purposeless distinctions, which have
arisen by historical accident and persisted to plague the common
law of crimes, have been eliminated; and each crime is fully defined, with all of its essential elements spelled out in the clearest
and simplest language possible. Lengthy enumerations, such as
those found in the present burglary, embezzlement, forgery and
arson statutes, have been eliminated and inclusive general terms
used in their stead. The drafting of each article was preceded by
a thorough consideration of pertinent decisions and commentaries.
This was done in order to be sure that the language used would
be broad enough to cover all intended situations, and yet would
not be too inclusive or indefinite. The advantage of careful generalization over lengthy enumeration is not solely stylistic. It
provides a much more adequate coverage of the prohibited antisocial activity, and precludes the frequently urged defense that
the act or actor involved does not exactly fit within any of the
2
specified enumerations.
An important change, effected throughout the Code, is the
elimination of minimum penalties, except for a few very serious
2. In State v. Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630 (1904), the court held that
'the burning of a "merry-go-round outfit" was not within an arson statute
(La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 847 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1940) § 762]) which enumerated "goods, wares and merchandise" and a long list of other objects as to
possible objects of the offense '. It made no difference that the act was "of
equal atrocity or of kindred character with those which are enumerated."
See also the recent case of State v. Mason, 197 La. 965, 2 So. (2d) 895 (1941),
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1940-1941
Term (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REmvw 273, where the defendant argued that
the forgery of a "completion certificate" in connection with an F.H.A. loan
was not criminal, since such certificate was not one of the instruments
enumerated in the forgery statute. It was only by a very liberal interpretation of that statute that the defense was overruled.
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offenses. This is in accord with a uniform trend in penal legislation to vest a larger discretion in the sentencing judge; and is in
recognition of the idea that the criminal himself (his age, physical and mental characteristics, social and economic background,
and chance of rehabilitation), as well as the specific crime committed, should be carefully considered in the imposition of sentence. The definitions of and distinctions between substantive
crimes are, at best, general legislative categorizations of criminal
responsibility.3
TITLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Too much stress cannot be placed upon the importance of the
provisions in Title I. These are, in general, applicable to all
crimes set out in subsequent articles of the Code. Descriptions of
offenses, which might otherwise appear incomplete or too inclusive, are supplemented and qualified by the general provisions in
this Title. Hence a careful study of Title I is essential to an understanding application and interpretation of the new Criminal

Code.
Preliminary Provisions
Certain frequently used terms, the exact meanings and scope
of which are important, have been defined in Article 2. This
eliminates the necessity of much cumbersome language in subsequent articles describing the various offenses. While most of
these definitions will be discussed in connection with the offenses
to which they relate, a few are of such a general nature as to call
for immediate comment. The distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors, based upon the possibility of imprisonment at
hard labor, is merely a restatement of the commonly accepted one
in this state and is consistent with the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure.4 The definitions of "person" and "whoever" have been
inserted to make the status of a corporate offender abundantly
clear. It is intended that corporations may be convicted of crimes
and subjected to fines, wherever the penalty clause of the crime
in question provides for that form of punishment. A penalty of
death or imprisonment is, of necessity, only applicable to natural
persons. The obsolete general concept of Article 443 of the Civil
Code, that a corporation cannot be guilty of a crime, is repudiated.
3. See Wilson, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime (1942) 5 LOUiIANA
LAw REviEW, 53.
4. Arts. 337-342, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. Uniform use of the unsatisfactory term "hard labor" in penalty clauses was necessitated by Art.
VII, § 41 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. (The requirement or possibility of a sentence at "hard labor" determines whether a crime is triable before
a judge, a five man jury or a twelve man jury).
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Article 3 is purely interpretative and epitomizes the "spirit"
of the Code. It adds nothing which should not naturally follow,
even.in its absence; and yet a conscientious understanding and
application of that article will do much to insure a sound interpretation of the Code. The method of analogical projection, often
permitted as to civil statutes, shall not be available in determining the scope of various crimes denounced.5 However, it is very
important that the provisions of the Code shall be given "a
genuine construction,according to the fair import of their words,
taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and
with reference to the purpose of the provision."6 A natural and
logical interpretation of the various terms employed in defining
the crimes is the necessary and hoped for construction.
It is inevitable that there will be some overlapping of the
various Code articles, and also of the Code articles and individual
statutes left unrepealed or enacted at the same legislative session.
Article 4 indicates a clear legislative intent that where this occurs there shall be no repeal by implication, and that the "special" provision shall not be applicable to the exclusion of the
"general." Instead, prosecution may be had under "either.' 7 A
few examples will serve to illustrate the application of this article. While the present lobbying statute8 has been expressly retained, certain conduct coming under that statute might also be
punishable as Public Bribery (Article 118) or Public Intimidation (Article 122). A number of civil statutes contain penal
clauses punishing false statements made under oath. This conduct
will also be punishable as False Swearing (Article 125). The 1942
legislature enacted a comprehensive statute on prostitution and
kindred offenses.9 These offenses are also fully covered by a number of articles of the new Criminal Code."1 In the above and other
similar situations prosecution may be under either, but not under
both, provisions. Where the two offenses are really the same the
offender will be amply protected from dual prosecution by the
existing law forbidding double jeopardy.1
5. Article 7 emphasizes the traditional principle that Louisiana criminal
law is purely statutory, and that no act is criminal unless defined as such
in the Code or other statutes of the state. State v. Robinson, 143 La. 543, 78
So. 933 (1918).
6. La. Crim. Code, Art. 4.
7. Accord: Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1933) § 654; Idaho Code Ann. (1932)
§ 17-301; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9924; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 21, § 23.
8. La. Act 234 of 1912, H§ 1-7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9279-9284].
9. La. Act 241 of 1942.
10. See La. Crim. Code, Arts. 82-86, 104, 105.
11. Art. 279, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. Const. of 1921, Art I, § 9.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. V

Article 5 restates the present law which permits a prosecution for lesser and included offenses. Thus the district attorney
may receive a plea of guilty for a lesser and included offense
where he feels, as a practical matter, that a conviction of the
greater offense actually committed would be highly improbable.
Then too, it should never be a defense for an offender to assert
that an aggravating element was present, making him guilty of a
12
more serious crime.

The second sentence of the article specifically recognizes the
established rule as to responsive verdicts. It provides that when
an indictment includes an accusation of a lesser crime, a verdict
convicting the offender of the less serious crime will be responsive. 18 Thus an indictment for aggravated battery would include
the lesser offenses of simple battery and aggravated assault, or
simple assault. An indictment for murder would include the
lesser crimes of manslaughter and negligent homicide. Aggravated arson would include simple arson, and armed robbery
would include simple robbery. A similar result would not follow
in the case of aggravated kidnapping. An accusation of that offense would not include simple kidnapping, for the latter offense
may well require certain elements which are not included in
aggravated kidnapping.14
Articles 7 through 12 set out traditional and well-settled principles as to the elements of crimes, with special emphasis placed
upon a statement of the "intent" element. Article 8 defines "criminal conduct" as requiring an act or failure to act which produces
"criminal consequences."' 5 In some cases a specific knowledge or
specific criminal intent is required; in others a general criminal
intent or even criminal negligence will suffice. In a few crimes the
mere act or failure to act is punished. 16 Article 10 is a condifica12. For example, it should not be a defense to a person charged with
manslaughter or with attempted murder to prove that he was guilty of the
more serious crime of murder.
13. Accord: State v. Barber, 167 La. 635, 644, 120 So. 33, 37 (1929). The
reason for such a rule is that it is impossible, in such case, to accuse a person of the more serious crime without accusing him of the less serious included offense, and proof of the first would necessarily involve proof of the
latter. See State v. Evans, 40 La. Ann. 216, 3 So. 838 (1888); State v. Flattmann, 172 La. 620, 626, 135 So. 3, 5 (1931).
14. Compare the aggrevated kidnapping and simple kidnapping articles.
La. Crim. Code, Arts. 442, 45(3). Subdivisions (2) and (3) of the simple
kidnapping article require elements which are not included in the offense of
aggravated kidnapping.
15. Article 9 defines "criminal consequences" and indicates that the phrase
is merely a shorthand method of referring to the various sets of consequences
described in detail in subsequent articles of the Code.
16. See La. Crim. Code, Art. 11.
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tion of generally accepted rules. A "specific" criminal intent
exists where the criminal consequence was "actively desired." A
"general" criminal intent will be found in all cases where there
is a specific intent, and also where it appears that the offender
"must have adverted" to the particular consequences. For example, the roomer who sets fire to a trunk in his quarters, in
order to defraud an insurance company, might well be convicted
of the serious offense of aggravated arson.17 Aggravated arson
only requires a general criminal intent, which is supplied by the
fact that the offender "must have adverted" to the fact that the
burning of the dwelling was "reasonably certain to result" from
the fire started.'8
Many crimes only require a general criminal intent. It is important to note the provision in the last sentence of Article 11,
that when the terms "intent" or "intentional" are used without
qualification in the definition of an offense they refer only to
"general criminal intent" as defined in the preceding article.
The definition of "Criminal Negligence" in Article 12, as requiring "a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to
be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances" is in accord with the usual conception of the term. It
calls for substantially more than the ordinary lack of care which
may be the basis of tort liability, and furnishes a more explicit
statement of that lack of care which has been variously characterized in criminal statutes as "gross negligence" and "recklessness."
'Culpability
The common law presumptions' 9 of the incapacity of an infant to commit a crime have not been recognized in Louisiana.
The test has been whether the child was of sufficient maturity to
know that the act was wrong and to be aware of his legal responsibility for its commission.2 0 Article 13 rejects both of these
uncertain approaches to the problem in favor of establishing complete immunity up to the age of ten years. This is believed to be
a more reasonable and realistic view.' The applicability of this
provision is more limited than it would at first appear. The
17. La. Crim. Code, Art. 51.
18. Accord: People v. Fanshawe, 137 N.Y. 68, 32 N.E. 1102 (1893).
19. At common law there was a conclusive presumption of incapacity
where the offender was under the age of seven years, and there was a rebuttable presumption between the ages of seven and fourteen. Clark and
Marshall, Law of Crimes (4 ed. 1940) 115-120, §§ 76-81.
20. State v. Nickleson, 45 La. Ann. 1172, 14 So. 134 (1893).
21. Accord: Proposed Ill. Pen. Code (1937) § 130(a).
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offender who is under the age of seventeen is not presently subject to criminal prosecution, except as to capital crimes and assault with intent to commit rape. His transgression is treated as
an "act of delinquency" which subjects him to the jurisdictions
of the juvenile courts. 22 This jurisdiction is expressly recognized
in Article 13. It is only when the juvenile commits a murder or
other capital crime that the problem of criminal responsibility
attaches. In such cases it is believed that greater justice and consistency of decision will result from a fixed age line, than by resorting to the common law presumptions or attempting to apply
the adult "right and wrong" test to infants. A child, under the
age of ten years is not of sufficient maturity to realize the criminal
nature of his act. While he is exempted from the harsh punishment necessarily imposed for criminal liability, his offense may
still be treated as an act of delinquency subjecting him to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
It is universally agreed that a man is not criminally responsible if he was so insane at the time he committed the act that
he was incapable of entertaining a criminal intent; but there is
considerable judicial disagreement as to when such incapacity
exists. Article 14 restates the familiar "right and wrong" test.
This test, which apparently originated in the famous "M'Naghten's Case," 23 presently prevails in Louisiana 4 and a majority of
American jurisdictions25 as the sole test of responsibility. Thus,
if because of a mental disease or defect the accused was without
the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong as to the
particular act at the time it was committed, he is not subject to
criminal liability. Some states have broadened the scope and
availability of the insanity defense by excusing the defendant
who may have known that the act was morally and legally wrong,
but was "irresistibly impelled" to its commission by reason of a
mental disease or defect.2 8 Such liberalizing tests are theoretically sound, but as a practical matter they open the door to a
further abuse of the already overworked insanity defense. 27 Any
22. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 52.
23. 1 Car. & K. 130, 10 Clark & F. 200 (1843).
24. State v. Tapie, 173 La. 780, 138 So. 665 (1931).
25. Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 123, § 84.
26. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577 (1886).
27. Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 128, 129, questions the
practical efficacy of the so-called "insane Irresistible impulse" test, and declares: "The objections made to this view are that it is doubtful whether
such a situation can exist in fact, that if it does it is difficult of proof, that
it is subject to abuses In the use of expert witnesses who testify both for the
prosecution and the defense in terms unintelligible to juries, and that its
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test of insanity where the jury is called upon to evaluate the conflicting testimony of expert witnesses who testify in terms far
above their meagre horizon of medical and psychopathic knowledge is bound to be somewhat unsatisfactory. However, it was
generally agreed by the experienced judges who acted as advisors in the preparation of the Code that the present "right and
wrong" test came as close to stating an understandable formula
for the jury as any which could be devised.
Article 15 is a codification of the well-settled rule that voluntary drunkenness or use of drugs does not exempt a man from
criminal responsibility, except where the intoxicated or drugged
condition has precluded the presence of a specific intent or a special knowledge which is an essential element of the crime
28
charged.
The Code maintains the traditional distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law. Article 16 provides that, unless
otherwise provided in the definition of a crime, a reasonable
ignorance or mistake of fact may preclude the presence of some
mental element and thus constitute a defense. For example, the
misappropriation or use of another's horse, under the reasonable
belief that it belonged to the offender, would not amount to theft
or the unauthorizeduse of movables, respectively. Ignorance and
mistake of law are not a defense; but Article 17 recognizes wellsettled exceptions, where the offender reasonably relied (1) upon
an apparently valid act of the legislature, or (2) upon a holding
of a competent court of last resort.2 9 Other more doubtful exceptions, which have occasionally been applied, were considered but
were rejected upon advice of the Council.2 0
sanction by the courts has popularized insanity as a defense and weakened
the force of the criminal court as a restraint of wrongdoers .... The defect

is in its application in practice due to the difficulty of the average jury in
weighing subsidized testimony of so-called alienists as to a past psychopathic

condition."
In State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890 (1904) the Louisiana court held
that the doctrine of moral insanity (which consists of irresistible impulse coexistent with mental sanity) had no support in either psychology or law.
28. Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 131-137, §§ 89-96; State

v. Haab, 105 La. 230, 29 So. 725 (1901), discussing the effect of insanity caused
from protracted drinking.
29. The authorities are collected in Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law
and Mens Rea (1941) 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 641.
30. The article originally presented by the draftsmen included a third exception as follows:

"(3) Where the offender was in doubt about the legality of his conduct,
and after communication with the public officer, reasonably relied on the
apparently honest advice or action of any public officer authorized to give
such advice or take such action, indicating that the proposed conduct of the
offender would be lawful." This exception was not supported by any Loulsi-
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The importance of Articles 18 through 22, which enunciate
the rules of justification, cannot be over-emphasized. Subsequent
articles defining the various crimes, which usually make no mention of this defense, must be read and construed in the light of
the justification provisions in Title I.
Article 18 collects a number of situations where it is generally
recognized that an act, which would otherwise be a crime, is justifiable and does not subject the actor to criminal liability. More
specificially, it covers compulsion, 1 physical impossibility, and
public, domestic and other lawful authority.
The most important, or at least the most litigated, instances
of justification, defense of person and propery, are treated in more
detail. Article 19 states the generally accepted 3 rule that one
may use reasonable and apparently necessary force in defense of
his person or his property. The facts of each case will determine
what is "reasonable" force. Apparent, rather than actual, necessity is the test.
In order to justify a homicide as being in self-defense the
person attacked must have actually and reasonably believed:
first, that he was in "imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm"; and second, that the killing was "necessary to save himself from that danger." These general requirements in Article 20 (1) are merely a codification of existing Louisiana jurisprudence. 3 It is anticipated that the Louisiana courts
will continue to hold that a person's belief that he is in danger
of losing his life or receiving serious personal injury is not "reasonable" unless it is founded upon an actual physical attack or
hostile demonstration by the deceased. 4
The question of the necessity of retreating in order to justify
ana cases and the relevant cases in other jurisdictions were few and confusing. The Advisors were in considerable doubt as to the proper scope or
advisability of this exception and the Council of the Institute finally decided
upon its deletion.
31. In extending the defhnse of compulsion to all cases "except murder,"
subdivision (6) goes slightly beyond Louisiana dicta which speak of compulsion as a defense in all "except capital cases." See State v. Capaci, 179 La.
462, 487, 494, 154 So. 419, 428, 429, 430 (1934).
The common law presumption, that a wife acting in her husband's presence acts under compulsion, was considered but rejected. In this day of full
emancipation for women, such a presumption is clearly illogical. Louisiana
courts have done lip service to the presumption, and then found it to be
rebutted upon one pretext or another. State v. Hollis, 163 La. 952, 113 So. 159
(1927); State v. Weeden, 164 La. 713, 114 So. 604 (1927).
32. Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 258, 259, §§ 206, 208.
33. State v. St. Geme, 31 La. Ann. 302 (1879); State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann.
1397, 26 So. 390 (1899); State v. LeJeune, 116 La. 193, 40 So. 632 (1906).
34. State v. Halliday, 112 La. 846, 36 So. 753 (1904).
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a killing as self-defense gave the Reporters considerable concern.
American writers" are in considerable doubt as to the proper rule
or prevailing doctrine. Louisiana has generally recognized a duty
to retreat, but with many not too clear qualifications. Article
20 (1) expresses no specific retreat formula. It simply requires
that the defendant must have had a reasonable belief that the
killing was necessary. The possibility of retreat, as is also the
possibility of prevention by force or violence less than killing, is
merely one of the factors that should be considered in determining the ultimate question of the apparent necessity of the homicide.3 7 If specific rules as to retreat were given, there might be a
tendency to judge the reasonableness of a person's belief in the
necessity of killing by that test alone.
A homicide is also justifiable for the purpose of preventing "a
violent or forcible" felony. This provision in Article 20 (2) is a
substantial codification of the present law, 8 but is slightly more
limited in requiring that the felony prevented must be one "involving danger to life or of great bodily harm." Most forcible and
violent felonies endanger human life; but where the circumstances are such that human life is not endangered (as in the
burglary of an empty dwelling), the'law should not recognize a
right to kill to prevent the crime. Once again an objective standard is adopted and the defendant must reasonably believe that a
forcible felony is about to be committed, and that killing is the
only safe method of prevention.
Article 21 restates another well-settled rule.'9 The aggressor
or person who brings on a difficulty has no right of self-defense,
except where he bona fidely withdraws from the conflict "in
such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he
desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict."
The right to use force or to kill in defense of others may be
exercised in protecting a stranger, as well as a servant or member of the family. This justification is subject to the same require35. Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 351, § 280; Beale, Retreat
from a Murderous Assault (1902) 16 Harv. L. Rev. 567.
36. State v. West, 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 So. 7 (1893); State v. Thompson, 45
La. Ann. 969, 13 So. 392 (1893); State v. Robertson, 50 La- Ann. 92, 23 So. 9
(1898); 1 Marr, Criminal Jurisprudence of Louisiana ,(2 ed. 1923) 127, § 67.
37. "Rationally the failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered
with all the others in order to determine whether the defendant went farther
than he was justified in doing; not a categorical proof of guilt." Justice
Holmes, in Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 502, 65
L.Ed. 961, 963 (1921).
38. See Carmouche v. Bouls, 6 La. Ann. 95, 54 Am. Dec. 558 (1851); 1
Wharton, Criminal Law (12 ed. 1932) 860, 863, §§ 627, 631.
39. State v. Plain, 171 La. 128, 129 So. 730 (1930).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. V

ment of apparent necessity as the right of self-defense. Louisiana
has recognized the right to intervene in defense of another, but
has held that the intervenor stands in the shoes of the person protected and has -only his actual rights of defense. 40 Thus if the person protected instigated the conflict the intervenor acts without
justification, regardless of how reasonable he may have been
in assuming that he was protecting an innocent party. Article 22
adopts the more liberal and common sense rule that the intervenor's acts are justifiable if he does what it is "reasonably apparent" that the party attacked might have done in his own behalf. 41 This view is also consistent with the objective test adopted
in the other articles on defense and the article on mistake of fact.
In certain instances, as in preventing the killing of another
person, the defense of another would also amount to the prevention of a felony. Under Article 22 one is not permitted to kill
in defense of an apparent aggressor. The general provision in
Article 20 (2) that one may kill to prevent a felony contains no
such limitation. In such a situation, it is intended and logically
follows that the specific article on defense of others should control, rather than the general article on prevention of felonies.
Parties
The new Code follows the present legislative policy of recognizing only two classes of parties to crimes, i. e., principals and
accessories after the fact.42 The Louisiana legislature early recognized the procedural difficulties inherent in a distinction between
the doer (principal at common law) and the procurer or aider
(accessory before the fact) 43 and that these difficulties were not
40. State v. Giroux, 26 La. Ann. 582 (1874); State v. Atkins, 136 La. 844, 67
So. 926 (1915).
41. This is generally considered as the better view. State v. Menilla, 177
Iowa 283, 158 N.W. 645 (1916); American Law Institute, Restatement of the
Law of Torts (1934) § 76; May, Law of Crimes (4 ed. 1938) 74, § 62; 26 Am.
Jur. (Homicide) § 160.
42. La. Crim. Code, Art. 23.
43. "At the common law both those who personally committed a felony
and those who were present and aided, assisted or encouraged the commission of the felony, were principals to the felony. Those who aided, assisted or
encouraged the commission of the felony, but were not present at its actual
commission, were accessories before the fact. ...
"Two procedural results flowed from the distinction:
"(1) The Indictment had to state whether defendant was indicted as
principal or accessory; and a defendant indicted as one could not be convicted as the other....
"(2) An accessory before the fact could not be convicted unless the principal had been convicted before the accessory's trial or was convicted at a
joint trial with the accessory." Hall and Glueck, Cases on Criminal Law
(1940) 486 (note on accessories). Thus if the principal was dead or a fugitive from justice the accessory could not be tried.
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compensated for by any sound reason for the distinction. 44 Thus,
in common with the legislatures of virtually every state, it sought
to simplify its criminal procedure by abolishing this common
law distinction. The first statute 45 which merely prescribed identical punishment for principals and accessories before the fact,
failed to accomplish this purpose; and it was still held that a person indicted as a principal could not be convicted as an accessory before the fact. 4 Article 238 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 expressly provided that accessories before
the fact might be indicted as principals and charged directly with
the commission of the crime; but in State v. Rodosta47 the Louisiana Supreme Court declared Article 238 unconstitutional on the
ground that it made a change in the substantive law, and thus
transcended the authority of the constitutional mandate providing for the drafting of a "Code of Criminal Procedure." The legislature immediately re-enacted the rule as a substantive criminal
statute which was even more explicit and forceful in declaring
that all persons concerned with the commission of a crime were
principals. 4 This statute was the basis of the broad definition of
"principals" in Article 24.
With this definition it is clear that anyone who procures, or
assists in, the commission of a crime may be indicted and tried
as a principal. While such an offender may be tried before the
doer (common law principal) or even although the doer is dead
or out of the jurisdiction, the state must still prove the fact of the
guilt of the alleged doer, for one cannot procure or assist in a crime
which has never been committed. It is thus anticipated that
Louisiana courts will continue to hold that the broad definition
of the term "principal" does not authorize the conviction of an
alleged procurer (common law accessory before the fact) where
the alleged doer (common law principal) has actually been tried
49
and acquitted.
44. "If there ever was forceful reason for drawing a distinction between
such procurer and doer, such reason has ceased to exist. Certainly, where one
procures another to do a criminal act, such act is in effect the act of the
procurer as well as that of the doer." Scharman v. State, 115 Neb. 109, 112,
211 N.W. 613, 614 (1926).
45. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 972 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 747].
46. State v. Accardo, 129 La. 666, 56 So. 631 (1911).
47. 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931).
48. La. Act 120 of 1932, §§ 1, 2 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) Arts.
237.1-237.2].
49. State v. St. Phillip, 169 La. 468, 125 So. 451 (1929), construing Article
238 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Accord: State v. Prudhomme, 171 La. 143, 129 So. 736 (1930). Contra: Roberts v. People, 103 Colo.
250, 87 P.(2d) 251 (1938), noted in (1939) 11 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 214.
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A person, incompetent by reason of sex, condition or class, to
commit a particular crime as a principle in the, limited common
law sense, may well be found guilty under the new Article 24.
For example, a woman, unable to personally commit the crime
of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, might assist a male offender by
persuading a young girl to submit. A husband might aid in the
crime of rape conimitted by another upon his wife. Such aiders
and abettors would clearly be "principals," and liable as such for
50

the crimes committed.

The accessory after the fact comes into the picture after a
felony has been committed. His criminal act is aiding, harboring
or concealing the offender. Existing Louisiana statutes were inadequate for codification purposes. The general accessory after
the fact statute, 51 following the usual form of the Crimes Act of
1805, merely prescribed punishment, but did not define the
offense. A statute punishing the harboring of criminals 52 defined
the offense, but has been limited by judicial interpretation to the
harboring of burglars. 53 Article 25 corresponds to the common
law and usual statutory definition of accessories after the fact, except in one particular. While the common law rule required
actual knowledge that the person aided had committed a felony,
the new law makes it sufficient that the accessory knew or had
"reasonable ground to believe" that the one assisted had committed a felony. Proof of actual knowledge is sometimes very
difficult, and the really innocent accomplice after the fact will be
protected by the concluding requirement that the assistance must
be rendered "with the intent that he may avoid or escape from
arrest, trial, conviction or punishment."
Generally speaking, virtually any sort of aid given to a fugitive felon, as furnishing a car, food, shelter or money to help him
evade the lawful authorities, will make the person assisting an
accessory after the fact. Certain activities authorized by law, as
the efforts of an attorney in behalf of the accused would consti5
tute justifiable conduct. '
Paragraph two expressly provides that trial of the principal
shall not be a prerequisite to trial of an accessory after the fact.
The fact that the principal offender has not been tried, or is for
50. Clark and Marshall, supra note 19, at 226, § 185; Note (1941) 131
A.L.R. 1322.
51. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 973 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 748].
52. La. Act 135 of 1938 § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 749].
53. State v. Wells, 195 La. 754, 197 So. 419 (1940) (statute held inapplicable to one who concealed a robber).
54. La. Crim. Code, Art 18(3).
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some reason (such as death or present insanity) not amenable to
justice, should not prevent trial of one who harbored him or
otherwise assisted him in dodging justice. While this provision
will greatly facilitate the trial of accessories after the fact, it is
still necessary to prove the guilt of the principal beyond a reasonable doubt. The liability of the accessory is directly- dependent
upon the guilt of the person aided.55
Inchoate Offenses
The general conspiracy and attempt articles provide a very
useful device for law enforcement. They enable the state to prevent crime by dealing with the criminal at an early stage before
the intended offense is actually completed. Also, where proof of
the consummated crime is difficult, the state may choose to prosecute for the lesser inchoate offense with a greater probability of
securing a conviction.
Article 26 is based upon a 1940 general conspiracy statute. 56
While there was some ambiguity in the existing statute,57 the new
Code provision makes it abundantly clear that a conspiracy to
commit any crime is included. Specific intent is an essential element of a conspiracy, for the offense "is heavily mental in composition."58 However, a specific knowledge of the criminality of
the act planned should not be required. It should be sufficient
that the conspirators specifically intended to bring about a result
in fact criminal. If the article is interpreted according to the "fair
import" of its language, and not in light of the common law decisions,5 9 the courts will apply the general rule that mistake of
law is no defense and will not permit conspirators to set up lack
of knowledge of criminality as a defense.
At common law only an unlawful combination or agreement
was necessary for a conspiracy, and subsequent change of heart
did not affect the participant's liability." The conspiracy article
adopts an additional requirement, found in the 1940 Louisiana
statute and in a majority of other recent conspiracy statutes,
that one of the conspirators must do an act in furtherance of the
55. Note (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 301, 302.

56. La. Act 16 of 1940, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 839.2].
57. See Bugea, Lazarus, and Pegues, Louisiana Legislation of 1940 (1940)
3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 98, 157.
58. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 624.

59. Commonwealth v. Benesch, 298 Mass. 125, 194 N.E. 905 (1935), noted
in (1935) 10 Wis. L. Rev. 526; Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at
169, § 126.

60. Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 168, 169, §§ 126, 127.
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object of the conspiracy. This additional element serves to guarantee the genuineness of the criminal agreement, and to preclude
a prosecution of those who bona fidely withdraw before the
offense is out of the talking stage.
Conspiracy is a separate and completely distinct offense, and
is not merely a lesser degree of the completed basic crime. It involves the additional element of combination or agreement of
purpose. Thus paragraph two expressly recognizes the present
common law rule 6 1 that where the conspirators have committed
the crime planned they may be tried for either the conspiracy,
the completed offense, or both. Prosecutions, for both the, conspiracy and the completed crime, will be rare; but there may be numerous cases where a district attorney will choose to prosecute for
the lesser offense when a prosecution for the completed felony
would be unlikely to succeed.
The general attempt article is an importafit innovation in
Louisiana law. Existing statutes provided only a random coverage of the offense. Attempts to commit murder, manslaughter,
rape and robbery were punishable under separate aggravated assault statutes. Occasionally a criminal statute expressly included
the person who attempted to commit the offense. In the absence
of such a provision, the offender who merely attempted to commit
a crime went unpunished by justice. The general attempt provision in Article 27 embraces an attempt to commit any crime,
whether a felony or a misdemeanor.62
In accordance with the purpose of the Code to fully define
the various offenses, the essential elements of an attempt are fully
set out. There must be a "specific intent" to commit the basic
crime, and an "overt act" directed toward that end. The requisite'
specific intent need not be proved by direct evidence and may be
inferred from the circumstances. For example, an intent to kill
may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon.6 3 Since the
subjective mental element is all-important in this offense, it is
expressly stated that an apparent, rather than an actual, ability
to commit the crime is sufficient.6 4 An attempted homicide may
61. Note (1931) 17 Corn. L. Rev. 136, collecting and discussing common
law decisions.
62. This is in accord with the general common law concept of attempt.
Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 153, § 113.
63. For a good practical discussion of the intent element, see Skilton,
The Mental Element in a Criminal Attempt (1937) 3 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 181.
Also see Hitchler, Criminal Attempts (1939) 43 Dick. L. Rev. 211.
64. The Canadian attempt statute served as a pattern. Canadian Crim.
Code (Snow, 1939) § 72.
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fail because the gun is defective or the poison is not sufficiently
deadly; an attempted rape may fail because the perpetrator is
impotent; or an attempted theft may fail because the cash drawer
looted or the pocket picked is empty. Where such conditions are
unknown to the offender they will not prevent his being guilty of
an attempt.
The attempt article adopts the generally accepted view that
"mere preparation" is not sufficient, and that there must be some.
act "tending directly toward the accomplishing" of the criminal
purpose. The distinction between preparation and a sufficient
overt act is one of nearness and degree which defies a more concise and detailed definition.6 5 However, it is expressly provided
that one who arms himself with a dangerous weapon and lies in
wait, or seeks for the intended victim, but is apprehended before
the victim appears, should be guilty of an attempt. But for this
special provision, such activity would probably be held insufficient for criminal liability.66
An attempt is clearly a lesser degree of the completed basic
offense. It requires no additional element such as the combination
or agreement necessary for a conspiracy. Where the contemplated
offense is begun, but not completed, the offender may be prosecuted for an attempt. The common law rule, that "failure" is an
essential element of an attempt, has been rejected; 67 and paragraph three expressly provides that an attempt does not merge,
in the completed offense.68 Thus, where an offender is indicted
for an attempt, evidence showing that the offense was actually
committed will not necessitate an acquittal. Of course, as in all
65. One writer provides the formula that the

offender's act must be

"something approximately connected with-fairly close to-the final consequence intended but not fulfilled." Skilton, The Requisite Act in Criminal
Attempt (1937) 3 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 308. Another helpfully states "all that

can be definitely gathered from the authorities is that . . . the first step . . .
is not necessarily sufficient and the final step is not necessarily required."
Hitchler, supra note 63, at 217.
66. In People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927), the defendant and

his fellow gangsters toured the city seeking a paymaster they sought to rob,
but were apprehended before they located their victim. The court compli-

mented the New York police upon their alertness in preventing a dangerous
crime, but released the offender on the ground that since he had not found
the paymaster at the time of his arrest he was not near enough to the accomplishment of the crime to be guilty of an attempt.
The special provision in paragraph 2 of Article 27 is in accord with former Louisiana statutes punishing lying in wait to commit certain serious
crimes (La. Act 26 of 1892, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1092]; and has

been declared to be within the proper scope of attempts by Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 157, § 116.
67. See Hitchler, supra note 63, at 221, 222.
68. Accord: Ariz. Code (1939) § 43-6108; Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1941)

l 663.
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cases of different degrees of the same generic offense, a conviction
or acquittal of a lesser degree (attempt) will preclude a subsequent trial for the greater (completed crime).
The penalty clauses in both the conspiracy and attempt articles provide that the penalty shall vary in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for the basic offense contemplated. In capital
crimes the maximum penalty for the inchoate offense is twenty
years at hard labor. In other cases the penalty is fixed at one-half
of that set for the basic offense. A real practical problem was
presented in regard to the crimes of theft and receiving stolen
things, since those offenses are graded according to the value of
the property misappropriated or received. For example, is the
offender who attempts to loot a cash drawer of whatever it may
contain guilty of attempted theft of property amounting to over
$100, over $20, or under $20? An accurate determination of the
amount the offender intended to steal may be almost impossible,
and yet it must control the grade of the offense, and whether the
habitual offender statute will apply.6 9 If all inchoate thefts were
to be punished according to the penalty for the most serious grade
of the offense, it would be unduly harsh on the offender who attempts or conspires to commit a.petty theft. If the penalty for
the lowest grade of theft were used as the base, it would be inadequate for the more serious conspiracies and attempts. Thus a
special provision has been inserted in the penalty clauses of Articles 26 and 27. It provides a maximum penalty sufficiently large
to take care of the more serious cases; and at the same time enables the court to impose a relatively light penalty in cases where
only petty theft is plotted or attempted. 0
TITLE

II. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

Homicide
Criminal homicide is divided into three offenses: murder,
manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Article 39 restates the
familiar common law "year and a day" rule, which has always
been recognized in this state. 7' The important crimes of murder
69. La. Act 45 of 1942 (habitual

offender statute)

is limited to felony

cases, and only theft of property amounting to over $100.00 is a felony.
70. Since the penalty clauses do not carry a possibility of hard labor, the
offense is not a felony and the offender will not be subject to the more dras-

tic provisions of the habitual offender statute.
71. State v. Kennedy, 8 Rob. 590 (La. 1845); State v. Moore, 196 .La. 617,
199 So. 661 (1940).
The article, as originally presented, expressly abolished the "year and a
day rule." It was felt that with modern developments in medical science the
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and manslaughter had never been defined by the Louisiana legislature. The Crimes Act of 1805 simply provided penalties and
directed the courts to look to the common law of England for
definitions. Therefore it was necessary to start at scratch, aided
only by past jurisprudence and the statutory definitions of other
states, in drafting the murder and manslaughter articles.
Article 30 does not provide the numerous refinements and degrees of murder which were found in some statutes examined.
The stereographed distinctions sometimes drawn between first,
second, third, and even fourth and fifth degree murder, have
served to perplex courts and juries without any corresponding
advantage in the administration of justice.7 2 Certain criminal
homicides which would have been within the common law definition of murder, but where the killing was not of a sufficiently
atrocious character to merit life imprisonment or capital punishment, have been shifted to the lesser offense of manslaughter
with its appropriately flexible penalty of not more than twentyone years at hard labor.
The traditional common law requirement of "malice aforethought, express or implied" was not included in the murder
article, since that expression means nothing apart from the decisions which interpret it. As a matter of fact neither "malice"
nor "aforethought," according to the generally accepted meanings
of those terms, was necessary for murder at common law.73 Rather
than use this vague and purely fictional phrase, relying upon past
decisions for its interpretation, the draftsmen specifically enumerated those situations where the homicide was to constitute muroffender was amply protected by the requirement that the state must prove
"beyond any reasonable doubt" that the injury was a proximate cause of

the death. However, the legislature did not feel this same confidence in modern medical testimony, and so they ordered a retention of the old common
law prescriptive period, beyond which no liability for criminal homicide shall

attach.
72. States subdividing the crime of murder usually make "deliberation
and premeditation" the distinguishing characteristic of first degree murder.
Mr. Justice Cardozo voiced a typical criticism when he declared, "The present distinction is so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can
fairly be expected to assimilate and understand it. I am not at all sure that I
understand it myself after trying to apply it for many years and after diligent study of what has been written in the books." Cardozo, Law, Literature
and Other Essays (1931) 100, 101.
73. Clark and Marshall declare, in speaking of malice aforethought, "It
must be construed according to the decided cases, which have given it a
meaning different from that which might be supposed." Clark and Marshall,
op. cit. supra note 19, at 288, § 237a. Perkins adds "It does not, for example,
indicate either 'malice' or 'aforethought' in what might be called the face
value of these words." Perkins, a Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought

(1934) 43 Yale L. J. 537.
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der. These enumerations coincide very closely with prior jurisprudence where the courts have attempted to apply the nebulous
requirement of "malice aforethought."
Subdivision (1) covers those homicides where the offender
had "a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." In
such cases the courts always found "express malice" under the old
common law definition. Even in the absence of such a specific
intent, the common law courts held that the homicide was murder
where the conduct causing the death was imminently dangerous
to others and evinced a wilful and wanton disregard of human
life.7" An additional subdivision in the murder article which
would have included such cases was deleted by the legislature.
As a result the offender who kills while wantonly shooting at a
train or through the window of a house, but without a specific
intent to kill or seriously injure, will be prosecuted for the lesser
crime of negligent homicide.
Subdivision (2) is a modified codification of the felony-murder doctrine. Existing Louisiana jurisprudence had recognized
and applied the common law rule that an unintentional homicide
committed in the perpetration of a felony was murder.7 The application of this rule to cases where a homicide is accidentally
committed in the perpetration of some of the less dangerous felonies has been severely criticized.7 6 With these practical considerations in mind, the murder article restricted the felony-inurder
doctrine to the more serious and dangerous felonies, e.g., aggravated arson, burglary in the nighttime, burglary in the daytime,
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery and simple robbery. A homicide accidentally committed in the perpetration of other felonies will constitute manslaughter under Article
31 (2) (a).
The possibility of grading the offense of manslaughter was
considered but rejected in favor of continuing the present policy
of the law. The wide variations of the offense are not susceptible
of a stereotyped legislative clas~ification, but are best taken care
of by a flexible penalty clause which gives the judge an oppor74. People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924) (shooting into
house); State v. Capps, 134 N.C. 622, 46 S.E. 730 (1904) (shooting into room
of house); Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. App. 165, 211 S.W. 217 (1919) (shooting

into train); Davis v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. App. 300, 292 S.W. 220 (1927) (shooting
into automobile); State v. Saunders, 108 W. Va. 148, 150 S.E. 519 (1929)
(shooting into crowd).
75. State v. McCollum, 135 La. 432, 65 So. 600 (1914); State v. Werner, 144
La. 380, 80 So. 596 (1919).
76. Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York (1937)

6 Fordham L. Rev. 43;

Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 300, § 245a.
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tunity to consider all the circumstances of the crime and sentence
accordingly.
Subdivision (1) of Article 30 is identical with the offense
which is usually labelled "voluntary manslaughter," and covers
intentional killings which are reduced from murder to manslaughter by reason of the fact that they are committed "in sudden passion or heat of blood" caused by a reasonable provocation.
Great provocation resulting in impulsive and uncontrolled .action
does not excuse the offense; but in recognition of the frailties of
human nature, the crime is reduced from murder to manslaughter. In view of the many and varying circumstances which may
result in an impulsive killing, a detailed enumeration of adequate
"provocations" was not practicable. Mere insulting words, a moderate blow, or adultery with a daughter or sister, standing alone,
have not usually been considered as a sufficient provocation; and
yet a combination of such factors may well be sufficient to reduce
the homicide to manslaughter.7 7 After considerable discussion, it
was decided that "reasonable provocation" should be left as a
jury question. Thus the jury will consider all the circumstances
of each individual case and determine whether the killing was
"caused by provocation sufficient to deprive the average person
of his self control and cool reflection." If a man unreasonably
permits his impulse and passion to obscure his judgment he will
be fully responsible for the consequences of his act. Even where
there has been an adequate provocation the homicide will not be
reduced to manslaughter if the offender's blood had actually
cooled (subjective test), or if the blood of the average man would
have cooled (objective test) .7 Here again the question of a reasonable time for cooling will be a jury question which will be
largely affected by the circumstances and seriousness of the provocation.
Subdivision (2) is similar to, but not quite as broad as, the
offense which is often labelled "involuntary manslaughter." It
covers unintentional homicides where the criminal liability is
predicated upon the nature of the activity the offender was engaged in at the time. An accidental killing in the perpetration of
any felony, other than those dangerous and forcible felonies
enumerated in the murder article, is manslaughter. Thus man77. In State v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 47 S.W. 1058 (1898) it was held to be
a jury question whether insulting words plus adultery, committed by a son-

in-law with defendant's daughter, constituted adequate provocation to reduce the killing to manslaughter.
78. Accord:

Ex Parte Fraley, 3 Okla. Cr. 719, 109 Pac. 295 (1910).
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slaughter comprehends certain killings which might be classed
as murder under the conventional unrestricted application of the
felony-murder doctrine. In regard to accidental homicides resulting 'from the commission or attempted commission of misdemeanors, Article 31 does not adopt the artificial, but generally
recognized, distinction between crimes malum in se and malum
prohibitum. The attempted definitions and practical applications
of this distinction have been far from uniform and definitely unsatisfactory. 71 Subdivision (2) (a) only includes killings which
occur in connection with misdemeanors "directly affecting the
person," such as assault, battery and false imprisonment. A similar New York provision was properly held inapplicable to a homicide by drunken and reckless driving. The court declared that the
statute was limited to misdemeanors "affecting some particular
person ... as distinguished from a misdemeanor affecting society
in general."80 Homicide, where liability is predicated upon safety
law violations, such as failure to obey traffic and firearm regulations, are shifted to the lesser offense of negligent homicide. In
prosecutions for this offense, violation of safety regulations will
be strong, but not conclusive, evidence of criminal negligence.
Also it will be necessary to show that such negligence was a proximate cause of the death.
The broad statement is often made that any killing by one
who is resisting a lawful arrest is murder.8 1 Under the new Code,
a resisting offender, who intended to kill or inflict great bodily
harm, would come within Subdivision (1) of the murder article if
the officer was killed. However, where an unarmed misdemeanant was resisting arrest in a mild manner which did not indicate
any malice or intent to seriously injure (such as pushing the officer or a relatively slight blow), he would only be guilty of manslaughter, under Article 30 (2) (b), if death accidentally resulted.82
79. For a good discussion of the various decisions in point, see Note

(1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 74. Compare Dixon v. State, 104 Miss. 410, 61 So. 423
(1913) with Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803 (1927).
80. People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48, 193 N.E. 634 (1934).
81. Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 270, § 88(E).

82. The well reasoned case of State v. Weisengoff, 85 W.Ca. 271, 101 S.E.
450 (1919), presents a nice illustration of the limitation intended. An officer
standing on the running board of defendant's moving car and endeavoring to
make an arrest was killed when the car ran into a bridge. The court instructed the jury that if the defendant intentionally ran against the bridge
the crime was murder; but that if his purpose was to cross over the bridge
into the next state in order to get out of the officer's jurisdiction, and the
collision was a mischance or accident, the crime was only manslaughter.

Accord: Dickey, Culpable Homicides in Resisting Arrest (1933) 18 Corn. L.
Rev. 373, 376.
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The lesser offense of manslaughter is much more appropriate for
such cases.
A homicide resulting from criminal negligence was manslaughter at common law. The reluctance of juries to convict of
manslaughter in such cases has indicated the need for a special
crime which would carry less stigma and provide a lesser penalty. 3 Thus thirty-four states have enacted negligent homicide
statutes. The old Louisiana "involuntary homicide" statute, enacted in 1930, was limited to deaths caused by the negligent operation of "vehicles. '8 4 Other negligent killings, if punishable, were
manslaughter. Article 32 is broader and covers all negligent
homicides. 85 For example, deaths caused by the grossly negligent
handling of firearms or explosives, by the grossly negligent construction of a bridge, or by the gross negligence of a doctor, would
now constitute negligent homicide rather than manslaughter. The
term "criminal negligence," as already pointed out, has been defined in Article 12 so as to require more than the ordinary negligence sufficient for civil liability, and to be virtually synonymous
with the usual conception of the term "gross negligence."
According to the better rule and clear weight of authority,
the mere violation of a speed regulation does not, without more,
amount to criminal negligence.8 Article 32 continues the policy
already declared in the former "involuntary homicide" statute,
and expressly provides that the "violation of a statute or ordinance shall be considered only as presumptive evidence of such
negligence. '87 This clause forestalls any possibility of the torts
doctrine that violation of a safety statute is negligence per se,
being carried over into the criminal law. 8
Assault and Battery
The conglomeration of existing assault and battery statutes
was of little help to the Reporters, except to indicate the evils of
numerous overlapping statutes. It was obvious that, with the
83. Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide: A Study in Statutory Interpretation
(1936) 25 Cal. L. Rev. 1; Comment (1937) 25 Ky. L.J. 70.
84. La. Act 64 of 1930 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 1047-1052].
85. Accord: Proposed La. Crim. Code (Livingston, 1825) Arts. 516-533.
86. People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 169 Pac. 152 (1917); State v. Schutte,

88 N.J. Law 396, 96 Atl. 659 (1916).
87. The article, as originally presented by the Institute, declared that
"driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs
shall constitute criminal negligence." This exception was deleted in legislative committee.
88. The Louisiana court, prior to the enactment of the involuntary homicide statute, had declared that the violation of a safety statute was criminal
negligence. State v. Wilbanks, 168 La. 861, 123 So. 600 (1929).
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inclusion of a general attempt article, the various special statutes
punishing assault and battery with the specific intent to murder,
kill, rape or rob, were no longer necessary. These offenses contain
all the elements of, and are really nothing more than, attempts to
commit murder, manslaughter, rape and robbery, respectively.
Applying Article 27, they will be appropriately punished, for the
penalty for an attempt is fixed in proportion to the severity of the
crime attempted."
After elimination of those assaults and batteries which will
constitute attempts, the offenses were graded according to the
means employed. Thus the use of a dangerous weapon distinguished an aggravated from a simple assault or battery. The use
of a dangerous weapon had been used as an aggravator in a number of existing Louisiana statutes, and by the better statutes
examined from other jurisdictions. The definition of a "dangerous
weapon," stated in Article 2, is a codification of Louisiana jurisprudence and an abundance of well-reasoned decisions are available for its interpretation. The term has been broadly defined,
with gases and liquids specifically included, thus avoiding the
necessity of special articles on scalding, acid throwing and kindred crimes. The test is not whether the instrument is inherently
dangerous, but whether it is dangerous "in the manner used." 90
Thus an iron rod 9' or a large piece of timber,9' when used in a
way likely to produce serious injury, may constitute a "dangerous
weapon."
The definition of a battery, in Article 33, reaffirms the general
view that the administration of poison or any other injurious
substance is a battery.9 3 Of course, the offender who administers
or attempts to administer a deadly poison will probably be prosecuted for the more serious offense of attempted murder.
Article 36 defines an assault to include either an "attempt" to
89. Attempts were generally punished as misdemeanors at common law.
This punishment was inadequate for such major offenses as attempted mur-

der, manslaughter, robbery and rape. Thus special statutes were enacted
making it a serious offense to assault or attack another with the intent to
commit these specific crimes. Note (1916) 14 Mich. L. Rev. 399, 401.

90. The Louisiana Supreme Court distinctly enunciated this test in State
v. Washington, 104 La. 443, 445, 29 So. 55, 56 (1900), when it declared, "Wheth-

er the weapon used by defendant was dangerous within the meaning of the
statute was a question for the jury to determine'upon considering not only
the character of such weapon, but by whom, upon whom, and in what manner it was used."'

91. State v. Lowry, 33 La. Ann. 1224 (1881).
92. State v. Alfred, 44 La. Ann. 582, 10 So. 887 (1892).

93. Accord: Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303, 19 Am. Rep. 350
(1873) (putting "love powder" in figs); State v. Monroe, 121 N.C. 677, 28 S.E.
547 (1897)

(putting croton oil in candy).
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commit a battery or the "placing of another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery." It is generally agreed that any
attempt to commit a battery is an assault; and following the general rule as to attempts the actual ability to accomplish the in94
tended purpose should be immaterial. For example, D commits
an aggravated assault if he attempts to shoot V with a gun, which
unknown to D, is unloaded. The second alternative in the definition covers cases where no battery is actually intended, but the
offender intentionally places another in the fear of a battery.
Thus in the above hypothetical case D would be guilty if he knew
the gun was unloaded but intentionally placed V in a reasonable
fear of being shot. The commentators and cases are sharply divided upon the advisability of imposing criminal liability in such
cases. The view adopted in the Code is predicated upon the fact
that such actions, despite the offender's secret intention, will
induce breaches of the peace. 5
While injuring by grossly negligent conduct has generally
been held to constitute a battery, 96 it is fundamentally a less serious offense than a battery committed by an intentional attacker.
The reckless motorist who runs down a pedestrian is hardly in
the same criminal class as the culprit who intentionally shoots or
stabs another. In order to draw a distinction between these two
inherently different offenses, a "battery" has been defined so as to
97
require an intentional use of force or violence and "negligent
injuring" has been made a separate and lesser crime. Article 39
(Negligent Injuring) follows the pattern of the negligent homicide article, in that violation of a statute or ordinance is only
presumptive evidence of negligence. Again all cases of injuring
by criminally negligent conduct are covered, thus including the
reckless handling of explosives, firearms or poisons.
Rape
The Crimes Act of 1805 had denounced rape as a crime punishable by death;9 8 and then, as in the case of murder and manslaughter, had merely directed the courts to look to the common
94. See discussion of "Attempts," page 20, supra.
95. Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872). See State v. Aleck, 41
Ann. 83, 84, 5 So. 639 (1889). In Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 248, 251, §§ 195, 200, the view of Commonwealth v. White is declared to be
"the better opinion."
96. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 32 N.E. 862 (1893); Tift v.
State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916).
97. La. Crim. Code, Art. 33.
98. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 787 [Dart's Stats. (1940) § 1090); La. Act 24
of 1878, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1090].
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law for its definition. The new Code has divided the offense of
rape into "aggravated rape" and "simple rape," to the end, that
the death penalty shall only apply to the more serious and aggravated cases. Three articles are included. Article 41 provides a
general definition of the offense. Article 42 specifies those situations where the offender will have committed the capital crime
of "aggravated rape." Article 43 embraces the less heinous cases
which are to constitute "simple rape," with an appropriately flexible penalty of from one to twenty years.
Every case coming within the aggravated rape article would
clearly have constituted rape under the common law definition
of that capital offense. Subdivision (1) covers the case of forcible
rape, where the female resists and her resistance is overcome by
the offender. In such cases it is essential that the victim must
have put up a genuine and bona fide resistance. Various expressions have been used in statutes and by courts in describing such
resistance. Some of them are: "all resistance in her power," "positive resistance," "reasonable resistance," and "the utmost resistance."'9 Regardless of the phrase adopted it is obvious that the
jury will require conclusive proof that the resistance is genuine.
After considerable debate, the Council of the Institute decided
that a requirement of resistance "to the utmost" was the statement most nearly in accord with the somewhat-uncertain existing
Louisiana jurisprudence. However, resistance to the utmost is not
essential under Subdivision (2), which covers situations where
suich resistance has been prevented by threats and a reasonable
fear of "great and immediate bodily harm." Subdivision (3) is a
codification of the general rule, consistently followed in Louisiana,
that a girl under the age of twelve is incapable of consenting to
carnal knowledge, and that intercourse with a child of such tender years is rape regardless of voluntary acquiescence. 00 In order
to provide the fullest possible protection to young girls, it is expressly stated that lack of knowledge of non-age shall not be a
defense. The fact of the girl's age, and not the offender's knowledge or reasonable belief, will fix criminal responsibility.
A number of the less serious situations, where the crime
would have been rape at common law, have been shifted to the
lesser offense of simple rape. In such cases a jury will seldom
convict the offender of a crime carrying the extreme penalty of
99. 1 Wharton, op. cit, supra note 38, at 995, § 734.

100. State v. Mehojovich, 118 La. 1013, 43 So. 660 (1907); State v. Folden,
135 La. 791, 66 So. 223 (1914); Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 5410.
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death or life imprisonment. Also the less drastic, yet still severe,
,penalty of from one to twenty years at hard labor is more appropriate to the offense committed. Subdivision (1) of the simple
rape article contemplates the carnal knowledge of a woman who
is in a drugged or intoxicated state which prevents her understanding the nature of the act, or renders resistance impossible.
This includes any case where the offender administered the intoxicant or narcotic, or where he knew or should have known of the
woman's abnormal condition. Thus, a young man who gets a girl
drunk and drowns her normal resistance in spirituous liquors
would be guilty of simple rape. If the intoxicants merely made
the girl more carefree, no crime would have been committed;
but if they robbed her of the capacity to understand the nature
of the act, the offender would be guilty of simple rape. Under the
old Louisiana law our hypothetical young man could only be tried
for common law rape, a crime carrying the stiff penalty of death
or life imprisonment. It is not surprising that, despite the frequent occurrence of the above situation, prosecutions were very
infrequent and no Louisiana convictions have come to the writer's attention. With the classification of such an offense as simple
rape, carrying a milder and more flexible penalty, there will be
a greater likelihood of the prosecution and conviction of truly
guilty parties.
Subdivision (2) specifically includes the case where the female's consent has been induced by a fraudulent impersonation
of her husband or by a pretended marriage with the offender.
Such an act was not rape, by the weight of common law authority, 0 1 on the theory that the woman understood the nature of the
act. However, the man who obtains a woman's consent by such
intrinsic fraud should not, if his guilt is proved beyond any reasonable doubt, go free of criminal liability. Simple rape is an
1 2
appropriate offense to cover such cases.
Subdivision (3) is in accord with a 1936 Louisiana statute' 8
which made carnal knowledge of an insane or feeble-minded
woman a lesser crime. Here again the test is whether the woman
was of sufficient mentality to understand the nature of the act.
101. Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 366, § 296. Courts have
held that the act was not rape where the woman understood the nature of
the act, but was induced to consent by a fraudulent impersonation of her
husband [State v. Brooks, 76 N.C. 1 (1877); Reg. v. Saunders, 8 Car. & P.
266, 173 Eng. Rep. 488 (1838)], or by a sham marriage [Draughn v. State, 12
Okla. Cr. 479, 158 Pac. 890 (1916)].
102. Accord: Ala. Code Ann. (Michle, 1928) § 5412.
103. La. Act 43 of 1936, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1940) § 1158.1].
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The offender is liable only if he "knew or should have known"
of the female's incapacity. 04 If the woman is of age and appears
to be of sound mind and intellect, there does not appear to be any
strong reason to hold that the man acts at his peril as to her
mental capacity.
Kidnapping
The old Louisiana kidnapping statute carried the death penalty, and yet it apparently covered any case where one person
10 5
forcibly carried or secreted another without authority of law.
It is conceivable that this statute might have been held applicable
to an ordinary case of false imprisonment or to the abducting of a
star athlete just before a big game. The new kidnapping articles
emphasize the kidnapper's intent. Aggravated kidnapping (Article 44) carries the usual death penalty, but is limited to kidnapping for ransom (with intent to extort). Other criminal seizures
and imprisonments will be punishable either as simple kidnapping (Article 45) or as false imprisonment (Article 46). The
aggravated kidnapping article embraces all cases where a kidnapper obtains control over another person for the purpose of
extortion, whether by enticing and persuasion or by forcible
seizure. The penalty clause was copied from the federal "Lindberg Law,"' 06 and specifically provides that if the victim is "liberated unharmed before sentence is imposed" the offender shall be
sentenced to life imprisonment rather than capital punishment.
This provision was inserted in 'the hope that it may tend to influence kidnappers to safeguard the lives and health of their victims.
Article 45 defines "simple kidnapping" and embraces those
cases where there is no intent to extort. Subdivision (1) covers
any case where a person is forcibly seized and carried to another
place against his will. The distance traversed is immaterial0 7 but
a mere enticement is not sufficient under this clause of Article 45.
The next two subdivisions deal with those needing greater protection, and are extended to include "enticing or decoying away."
104. Accord: State v. Schlichter, 263 Mo. 561, 173 S.W. 1072 (1915).
105. La. Act. 412 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 1301.11.
106. 48 Stat. 781 (1934), 18 U.S.C.A. § 408a (Supp. 1940).
107. The clause added in the 1938 statute (La. Act 412 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 1301.1]) "from one part of a Parish of this State
to another part of the same Parish" was clearly surplusage in light of the
decision In State v. Backarow, 38 La. Ann. 316 (1886). The kidnapping articles in the new Code simply state "from one place to another," and contemplate any taking out of the state, or from one place to another within
the state, parish, or city.
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Subdivision (2) covers the taking or enticing away of a child
under the age of fourteen years. Subdivision (3) covers the abduction of inmates from orphan, insane, feeble-minded or similar
institutions, and supplants a 1932 statute carrying a somewhat
similar penalty. 10 8
Article 46 provides the usual definition of false imprisonment,
and complements Subdivision (3) of the aggravated kidnapping
article. The presence or absence of an intent to extort distinguishes the two crimes.
Defamation
Oral defamation (slander) was not an indictable offense at
common law, but the malicious publication of a defamatory writing or picture (libel) was a misdemeanor. 1 9 However, an oral
defamation, as in the case of a speech before a large gathering,
may be more injurious than the libel written in a letter to a third
person. Every state has enacted both libel and slander statutes,
but the latter show much variation in scope. While the existing
Louisiana statutes had been confusing and inadequate, the two
offenses were equally inclusive. Adhering to the idea that oral
and written defamation are equally anti-social, the new Code
has combined libel and slander in a single crime entitled "defamation." This will have the additional advantage of eliminating
the controversial question as to whether defamation over the
radio is libel or slander. 110
"Defamation" is defined by Article 47 so as to include "any
manner" of publication or expression, whether written, printed,
pictorial or oral. It is also expressly required that the defamatory
statement be communicated to some person other than the party
defamed."" The enumeration of situations where the malicious
publication or expression will be criminal covers three general
classifications: Subdivision (1) embraces the generally recognized
case where the defamatory statement tends to expose a living
person to "hatred, contempt or ridicule." Subdivision (2) includes
defamation of the memory of a deceased person. This would not
108. La. Act 215 of 1932, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 1302.1].
109. Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19, at 577, 609, § 430, 446.
110. Comment (1938) 26 Geo. L. J. 475.
111. In some jurisdictions a criminal libel is committed even though the
defamatory writing is communicated only to the libeled person. May, Criminal Law (4 ed. 1940) 157, § 118. The requirement of Article 47 that the defamatory matter be communicated to a third person is in accord with the
present Louisiana law as to publication in civil suits, Tuyes v. Chambers,
144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919); and with the probable rule as to criminal cases.
See State v. Roy, 158 La. 352, 104 So. 112 (1925).
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have been criminal at common law, but is expressly included in
the better modern statutes. 1 12 Subdivision (3) supersedes and
takes the place of numerous special statutes enacted to protect
the credit and good will of banks, insurance companies and other
similar businesses: It covers malicious publications or expressions
which tend to injure the business or occupation of any person or
firm.
Article 48 settles the somewhat clouded issue as to the effect
of truth in a criminal prosecution for a non-privileged defamatory
communication. Where the publication or expression is false it is
presumed to be malicious and the accused must overcome this
presumption by showing a justifiable motive However, where
the statement iS true the state has the burden of proving actual
malice. This is a change from the general criminal law rule that,
except in privileged communications, malice is always presumed
from the fact of publication." 3 The early common law maxim,
"the greater the truth the greater the libel," had been taken over
by our American decisions as a part of the common law of
crimes; but it was so incompatible with the public policy in favor
of free dissemination of the truth that it has been altered by
statute in many states and has never been applied in civil actions. 14 Under the new Code, the truth of a defamatory statement
will be material in determining criminal, as well as civil, liability.
Certain situations have been rather uniformly recognized as
creating a "qualified privilege." In such cases no presumption of
malice arises from the mere publication or utterance of the defamatory matter; and actual malice must be proved regardless
of the truth or falsity of the communication. Article 49 is a substantial codification of the law of "qualified privilege," as gleaned
from the jurisprudence of Louisiana and other American states.
It enumerates those situations where the relationship of the
parties, or the nature of the publication, is such as to raise a presumption that the statement was made to serve a legitimate purpose and not because of a malicious motive. Subdivision (1)
covers the case of a "fair and true report" of judicial, legislative
or other public proceeding." 15 Subdivision (2) contemplates comments upon persons who submit themselves to the public, or upon
112. Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1931) § 248; Ill. Rev. Stats. Ann. (SmithHurd, 1935) c. 38, § 402, c. 126, § 4; N.Y. Pen. Law (McKinney, 1938) § 1340.
113. State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508 (1938). Clark and Marshall,
op. cit. supra note 19, at 578, § 430b.
114. Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 853, § 95.
115. Leininger v. New Orleans Item Pub. Co., Inc., 156 La. 1044, 101 So. 411
(1924) (newspaper account of report made to city council).
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things submitted by their authors or owners to the public, provided such comments are made "in the reasonable belief" that
they are true.118 Subdivision (3) embraces cases where the relationship between the person making the communication and the
person to whom the communication is made is such as to afford a
reasonable presumption of a proper motive. 117 The fourth subdivision recognizes the qualified privilege of an attorney or party
in a judicial proceeding. 1 8
In certain cases an entire freedom of expression is socially
desirable. Article 50 declares an absolute privilege in such situations, and prohibits any prosecution for defamation, regardless
of the truth or falsity of the communication of the author's motive. Subdivision (1) simply restates the well-settled privilege
accorded to legislators and judges. 119 Subdivision (2) adopts a
rule, generally recognized in civil defamation cases, 120 that a witness to a judicial proceedings has an absolute privilege as to
testimony which is reasonably believed to be pertinent and ma12
terial. '

BIRD's

EYE

VIEW OF TITLES III

THROUGH VII122

Offenses Against Property
Common law arson was limited to the burning of a dwelling
house of another. Special statutes, in Louisiana and elsewhere,
extended the crime to include the burning of other structures
and of movables. Additional statutes covering destruction by explosives added to the mass of statutory material. The arson
articles in the new Code embrace damaging by both explosives
116. Flanagan v. Nicholson Pub. Co., 137 La. 588, 68 So. 964 (1915) (newspaper criticism of action of labor union official).
117. State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508 (1938) (letter by father to
custodian of minor child, criticizing the custodian's sister).
118. Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1906); Dunn
v. Southern Ins. Co., 116 La. 431, 40 So. 786 (1906).
119. Legislators are granted a constitutional immunity, La. Const. of
1921, Art. III, § 13. The absolute judicial privilege is a codification of a well
settled common law rule. Newell, Slander and Libel (3 ed. 1914) 517, § 520.
120. Oakes v. Walther, 179 La. 365, 154 So. 26 (1934).
121. This rule is advocated by Harper, Law of Torts (1933) 530, § 248.

Subdivision (2) is broad enough to cover other proceedings where testi-

mony may be required, such as proceedings before administrative tribunals
and legislative hearings.
122. The writer only purports to hit the high spots and stress some of

the more fundamental features of the articles in Titles III-VII. It is con-

templated that a companion paper, containing a more comprehensive and detailed discussion of the articles in Title III, will appear in the fourth issue
of this volume. The article in Titles IV-VII are of less general importance
and interest. Thus, a briefer discussion of the nature of those articles and of

the changes effected should suffice.
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and burning. The common law requirement of a "dwelling house"
has been rejected, and the essence of aggravated arson 123 is a foreseeable danger to human life. The burning during business hours
of a picture show or a store would clearly constitute aggravated
arson. Where human life is not endangered the offense is simple
arson.12 4 This crime is truly an offense against property and the
penalty is graded according to whether the damage done amounts
to five hundred dollars or more.
The offense of arson with intent to defraud 12 1 is broader than
the former Louisiana statute, 1 26 and specifically embraces the
burning of "any property," whether movable or immovable.
The criminal damage to property articles follow the same
general outline as that adopted for arson, with danger to human
life and damage to property serving as a basis for distinguishing
the aggravated 2

7

and simple12 grades of the offense.

Turning next to the important burglary crimes, three concise
and simply stated articles supplant a number of involved and
sometimes overlapping statutes. These former statutes had
adopted the common law requirement of a breaking and entering,
but the "breaking" actually meant very little. Louisiana and common law courts have declared the offense to be burglary where
the offender pushed open an unlatched screen door, raised a window that was already partly open, entered Santa Claus fashion
through an open chimney, or broke out after entering without
even a technical breaking. The new burglary articles only require
an "unauthorized entering," to the end that courts will no longer
find it necessary to tax their legal ingenuity for a fictional breaking. It is essential to the offense that the burglar must have entered "with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein."
This is a little broader than the common law requisite of an "intent to commit a felony," but is in line with the trend in modern
burglary statutes.
The aggravated degrees of the offense-burglary in the nighttime 2 9 and burglary in the daytimel°-are also somewhat broader
123. La. Crim. Code, Art. 51.
124. La. Crim. Code, Art. 52.
125. La. Crim. Code, Art. 53.
126. La. Act 211 of 1928, § 4 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 753]. This statute
was limited to the burning of goods and merchandise with intent to defraud.
Criminal liability for a similar burning of one's own dwelling was not at all
certain.
127. La. Crim. Code, Art. 55.
128. La. Crim. Code, Art. 56.
129. La. Crim. Code, Art. 60.
130. La. Crim. Code, Art. 61.
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than the common law offense. They contemplate the unauthorized
entry into "any structure, watercraft or movable where a person
is present," as well as the traditional "inhabited dwelling." In
addition to the requirement as to the nature of the place entered,
it is also essential that the burglar either be armed with a dangerous weapon or commit a battery in the course of his crime.
If the offender commits an unauthorized entry with the intent to commit a felony or theft, but where the above aggravating
circumstances as to the nature of the structure and as to the
means employed are not both present, he is only guilty of simple
burglary31 ' which carries a considerably lesser penalty. This
crime is analogous to the burglary of sundry buildings statutes
which are found in almost every state.
The most significant change effected throughout the entire
Code is found in the theft article which combines all stealing
crimes in one. 132 The technical distinctions between larceny, embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses are without
any substantial basis. It is well known that the separate crime
of embezzlement arose out of the inadequacies of the crime of
larceny. Larceny was formerly a capital offense and as such was
strictly limited in scope. With a lessening of the penalty for larceny, the old restrictions remained. Thus early courts indulged
in such familiar fictions as the doctrine of "breaking the bulk" to
catch the bailee who turned thief; or as the doctrine of "constructive possession" to catch the servant who stole his master's
goods. When these devices failed the legislatures stepped in and
created the separate, but very similar, crime of embezzlement.
The distinction between "larceny by trick" and obtaining property by false pretenses, depending upon whether the owner intended to part with "possession" or "property" in the goods, is
also largely a product of historical accident. Then, too, when none
of the above crimes seemed to fit, ingenuous district attorneys
might insert a count for violation of the "confidence game" statute. The above sketchy summary gives only a partial picture of
the confusion as to the stealing crimes. Distinctions had been
heaped upon distinctions, and then any number of special statutory classifications superimposed; and only partial relief had been33
secured by liberal procedural rules as to responsible verdicts.
Under the new Article 67, all cases where one person takes or
131. La. Crim. Code, Art. 62.
132. La. Crim. Code, Art. 67.
133. See Art. 246, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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misappropriates another's property will be theft regardless of the
relationship of the parties (whether the offender is bailee, servant
or agent), or of the means employed (whether by stealth or by
false pretenses).
It is essential to the crime of theft that the offender must
have specifically intended to permanently deprive the owner of
whatever may have been the subject of the offense. Where a
person takes another's automobile or bicycle, without the owner's
consent but intending to return the same, he is not guilty of
theft. In such a case he has committed the lesser offense of un4
authorized use of movables."
Robbery is a theft committed "by use of force or intimidation." The property must be taken from the person of another or
from his immediate control. The distinction between armed robbery'35 and simple robbery"16 depends upon whether or not the
offender is armed with a dangerous weapon. In the latter instance
there is not the same inherent danger to human life, and the
penalty clause permits a light sentence in appropriate cases.
7
The crime of receiving stolen things"1
is largely based upon
8
a 1938 Louisiana statute."3 The fines provided for the receiver of
goods valued at less than one hundred dollars have been raised
considerably. The article, as originally presented by the reporters,
carried a maximum sentence of fifteen years, regardless of the
amount received. It was felt that the "fence" for stolen things
was a very substantial cause of juvenile and negro petty thievery.
Also where a conviction was secured it was usually very difficult
to prove the receipt of any very substantial amount of property,
for it is rather generally conceded that for one detection, there
are about a hundred receipts of stolen property which avoid the
law. However, the idea that the receiver should not be punished
more severely than the thief was well rooted; and the reporters
were instructed to draft a penalty clause, substantially like the
existing statute, which graded the offense according to the
amount received. In view of the difficulty of proving actual
knowledge that the goods received were stolen, the article has
adopted the completely objective test and it is sufficient that the
offender "had good reason to believe" that the goods had been

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

La .Crim. Code, Art. 68.
La. Crim. Code, Art. 64.
La. Crim. Code, Art. 65.
La. Crim. Code, Art. 69.
La. Act 369 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 1306].
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the subject of theft or robbery. This is a departure from the subjective actual knowledge requirement of the old law.
False accounting139 is a new and definitely needed offense, in
view of the large number of situations where the civil law requires an accounting but provides no punishment for the rendering of a false account. The forgery1 4 and extortion 4' articles are
simply and directly stated, in striking contrast to the former
Louisiana laws on those subjects. The article on issuing worthless
checks14' is a substantial restatement of the old "bad check statute.143 The Reporters originally proposed a definition of the offense

which would have included the giving of a worthless check in
payment of an antecedent debt.'4 However, upon a suggestion of
the Advisers, they returned to the usual requirement (as found
in the existing Louisiana statute), that the offender must receive
something of value for the check.
Offenses Affecting the Family
The criminal neglect of family articles' 45 were copied largely
from a 1932 Louisiana statute, 46 which was a substantial enactment of the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act.' 4 T In addition

to, or in lieu of, the usual sentence of a flat fine or imprisonment,
the court may issue an order directing the payment of weekly
alimony to the neglected wife or minor child. 148 These provisions,
necessarily lengthy and detailed, provide a device whereby the
wife is enabled to secure periodic payments for support without a
decree of divorce or judicial separation. 1 49
The former bigamy statute only covered cases where the bigamous marriage was contracted in Louisiana. 5° The new bigamy
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

La. Crim. Code, Art. 70.
La. Crim. Code, Art. 72.
La. Crim. Code, Art. 66.
La. Crim. Code, Art. 71.
La. Act 209 of 1914, §§ 1, 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
Accord: Mo. Stat. Ann. (1932) 2998, § 4305.
La. Crim. Code, Arts. 74, 75.

§§

676, 677].

146. La. Act 77 of 1932 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 927].
147. 10 U.L.A. 1 (perm. ed. 1922).

148. The old statute provided only for weekly alimony payable to the
wife. Article 75 also empowers the court to order the payment of periodic
alimony.to the neglected child. Accord: Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport
Act, § 4, 10 U.L.A. 57 (perm. ed. 1922).
149. In Louisiana a wife cannot bring a civil suit against her husband

for support unless she makes her claim for alimony as an incident to a suit
for separation from bed and board or for divorce. Art. 105, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Mary Heyob v. Husband, 18 La. Ann. 41 (1866); Moore v. Moore,
18 La. Ann. 613 (1866).
150. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 800 (Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1126].
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article'' goes further and includes the "habitual cohabitation" in
this state with a bigamous husband or wife. For example, if a
bigamous marriage was contracted in Texas and the couple came
into Louisiana to live the twice married party would be guilty
of bigamy by reason of the cohabitation in this state. This enlarging of the scope of the crime is in line with the primary purpose
of such enactments, e.g., the prevention of illegitimacy. Certain
exceptions are expressly set out to the end that only the conscious
wrongdoer shall be punished for bigamy. Exceptions (1) and (2),
absence for five successive years, and a valid divorce or annulment, were copied almost verbatim from the existing statute.
Exception (3) is an express restatement of the rule bf State v.
Sparacino52 that a reasonable belief in the death of the absent
spouse (where the absence has been for less than the five year
or in the fact or validity of a former divorce, shall be a
period) ,'153

defense. This last exception is a minority view, but has a definite
practical justification. There is no substantial social justification
for convicting a man of a felony where he has remarried after his
spouse's estate has been probated, believing in common with all
others that she was dead; or where he has remarried upon an innocent belief that a decree of separation from bed and board had
completely dissolved his marital relationship. The court may
in such
impose nominal sentences, or pardons may be granted,
5
cases, but the social stigma of the conviction remains.1
The offense of incest is graded according to the degree of
relationship. 155 The marriage or cohabitation of cousins, although
such marriages are prohibited by the Civil Code, is not a crime.
This is in accord with the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of the former incest statute. 5
The miscegenation article"1 ' is based upon a 1910 concubinage
151. La. Crim. Code, Art. 76.
152. 164 La. 704, 114 So. 601 (1927).

Accord:

Thomas v. The King, 59

Comm. L. Rep. 279 (Australia, 1937).
153. Where, as in most statutes, .an absence for a prescribed period of
years or a valid divorce are stated as exceptions, the great weight of author-

ity is to the effect that these are the only possible exceptions. These courts
apply the maxim "expressio un us e8t excluoso alterius." Commonwealth v.
Mash, 7 Metc. 472 (Mass. 1844); Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 90, n. 199, § 57(c).
154. See Trowbridge, Criminal Intent and Bigamy (1918) 7 Calif. L.

Rev. 1.
155. La. Crim. Code, Art. 78.
156. State v. Couvillon, 117 La. 935, 42 So. 431 (1906). An original draft of
the incest article, which included cousin marriages and would have made the
civil and criminal law definitions uniform, was rejected by the Louisiana State
Law Institute Council.
157. La. Crim. Code, Art. 79.

1942]

THE LOUISIANA CRIMINAL CODE

statute, 158 and punishes black and white marriages or habitual
cohabitation. Another statute, 15 9 prohibiting concubinage between
Indians and negroes, had been of little social utility, and its subject matter was not included.
Offenses Affecting Sexual Immorality
Carnal knowledge of a juvenile 60 is the act of sexual intercourse with a girl under seventeen years'16 of age, either with or
without her consent. Where the girl is under the age of twelve
years, the more serious crime of aggravated rape162 is committed.
In order to afford the fullest possible protection to young girls, it
is expressly provided that a mistake as to the female's age shall
not be a defense. While a reasonable mistake of fact is generally a
defense, here is one situation where, even without special statutory authority, the courts have held that the offender acts at his
peril. 63 Other acts of sexual misconduct, committed upon the person or in the presence of a juvenile of either sex, will be punishable as indecent behavior with juveniles.6 This offense is a misdemeanor; and again it is specifically stipulated that lack of
knowledge of the child's age shall not be a defense.
Prostitution,and the related offenses of soliciting for prostitutes, pandering, letting premises for prostitution, and enticing
minors into prostitution are covered by a series of succinctly
stated articles,6 5 which provide a complete coverage of these
offenses. Another statute, covering these same crimes in the oldstyle method of detailed enumeration, was enacted at the same
session of the legislature. 66 While it is regrettable that the same
offenses should be twice covered,'67 the dual enactments should
not cause any difficulty, since Article 4 expressly authorizes prosecution under either the appropriate Code article or the special
statute.
158. La. Act 206 of 1910 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 1128-1130].
159. La. Act 230 of 1920 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1131-1134].
160. La. Crim. Code, Art. 80.
161. The "age of consent" line has been reduced from eighteen to seventeen years. This is in accord with the age limit which controls the jurisdiction of juvenile courts.
162. See La. Crim. Code, Art. 42.
163. State v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938).
164. La. Crim. Code, Art. 81.
165. La. Crim. Code, Arts. 82-86.
166. La. Act 241 of 1942.
167. The enactment of a separate statute is largely explained by the fact
that the legislators, and their constituents, were much impressed with the
urgent necessity of laws adequate for the stamping out of prostitution around
the various army camps in Louisiana.
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The abortion and distributionof abortifacientsarticles 6 s substantially restate existing Louisiana statutes, with some modification in the interests of clarity and formal consistency. A number
of changes, which would have liberalized and modernized the
offense of abortion, were considered by the Reporters and the Institute, but were rejected by reason of their highly controversial
nature.
The key words in the otherwise all-inclusive gambling
article 69 are the phrase "as a business." Any form of gambling
conducted as a business is criminal.' The article supplants numerous special statutes and will include lotteries, card and dice
games in gambling houses, slot machines and other similar devices whereby the proprietor makes a profit from the risks taken
by others. On the other hand, a friendly poker game or a group
"shooting craps" would not be committing any crime. Such activities have seldom been prosecuted, and no logical end is served by
laws which are universally violated with impunity.
The sale of liquor and dangerous weapons to persons under
the age of twenty-one will constitute the crime of unlawful sales
to minors. 17 1 The seemingly high age limit of twenty-one years is
in accord with existing Louisiana statutes, 7 2 and was recommended by the Council of the Institute. Again, as in other offenses
affecting juveniles and minors, lack of knowledge of non-age is
not a defense. In this regard the article goes further, and should
be more effective, than former statutes.
Contributing to the delinquency of juveniles173 and cruelty to
juveniles174 complete the list of adult offenses particularly affecting those of tender years; and are a substantial re-enactment of
existing statutes.
168. La. Crim. Code, Arts. 87, 88.
169. La. Crim. Code, Art. 90.
170. Pari-Mutuel Wagering on horse races is authorized by a special
statute (La. Act 276 of 1940), which is expressly saved in Section 3 of the
Criminal Code.
One may raise a query as to the validity of such authorization, in view
of the express declaration in La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 8, that "Gambling
is a vice and the Legislature shall pass laws to suppress it."
171. La. Crim. Code, Art. 91.
172. La. Act 46 of 1890 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 1276-1277] (selling
weapons to minors prohibited); La. Act 93 of 1906 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932)
§ 1369-1372] (selling liquor, etc., to minors).
173. La. Crim. Code, Art. 92.
174. La. Crim. Code, Art. 93.
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Offenses Affecting the Public Generally
The traditional crime of illegal discharge of firearms in public
places has been enlarged so as to include "the throwing, placing
or other use of any article, liquid, or substance." In either case
criminal liability is limited to situations where it is foreseeable
that death or great bodily harm may result. The new and broader
crime is labeled illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities.1 5 The related offense of illegal carrying of weapons"7 is
committed by the concealment of a dangerous weapon on one's
person, or by mere possession of such a weapon by an alien enemy.
Obstruction of highways of commerce is graded, as were arson
and criminal damage to property, according to the foreseeability
of danger to human life. The serious felony of aggravated obstruction of a highway of commerce17 7 is committed where the
obstruction endangers human life, as in the case of a dangerous
obstruction on a railroad track or on an airport runway. In simple
obstruction of a highway of commerce,1 8 it is sufficient that the
offender's act has rendered the movement of traffic more difficult.
This lesser grade of the offense is only a misdemeanor.
The most important driving offense is that of operating a
vehicle while intoxicated."79 This crime is not limited to automobiles, but also includes airplanes, boats and all other means of
conveyance. A more severe penalty, with a minimum sentence
of one hundred dollars and thirty days imprisonment, is provided
for the second or subsequent conviction. 80 The lesser offense of
reckless operation of a vehicle'8 i follows the same general pattern,
but with appropriately lesser penalties. This group of crimes is
completed with a hit and run driving article, 8" requiring the
driver of any vehicle involved in an accident to stop, give his
175. La. Crim. Code, Art. 94.
176. La. Crim. Code, Art. 95.
177. La. Crim. Code, Art. 96.
178. La. Crim. Code, Art. 97.
179. La. Crim. Code, Art. 98.
180. By increasing the possible maximum penalty, the necessity for a
special article on intoxicated driving which caused injury to person or property was eliminated. Cf. La. Act 320 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5293.15293.7] (intoxicated driving which caused personal injury or property damage). Under Article 98 the maximum penalty for both the first and the
multiple offender Is sufficiently large to permit the sentencing judge to take
damage done by the offender into consideration as an aggravator.
181. La. Crim. Code, Art. 99. This article is substantially in accord with
the present Louisiana statute (La. Act 286 of 1938), and with the Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic on Highways, § 19, 11 U.L.A. 20 (1938).
182. La. Crim. Code, Art. 100.
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identity and render reasonable aid. This new article is much
183
clearer than the former "hit and run" statute.
Special protection to the public sensibility is provided by
articles punishing the desecration of graves8 4 and cruelty to animals. 8 5 This latter offense is stated in terms sufficiently broad to
embrace all kinds of intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment of animals.
Disturbing the peace8" is a misdemeanor which includes the
doing of any of a number of enumerated offensive acts "in such a
manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public." The
public interest in the prevention of disorderly, illegal and immoral conduct is further protected by articles making it criminal
to keep or to let a disorderly place.1 8 7 The broad definition of a

disorderlyplace,'88 as "a place to be used habitually for any illegal
or immoral purpose," eliminates the necessity of the verbose
enumeration found in most statutes.
The obscenity article'8 9 embraces a wide range of immoral
and obnoxious practices. Subdivisions (1) and (2) cover the traditional obscenity situations-indecent public exposure of one's
person, and the sale or display of any indecent material. Two
additional subdivisions were added to cover a type of very reprehensible conduct which had given the police department in New
Orleans and other larger cities considerable trouble. There was
no present law which punished the sexual pervert who frequents
parks and other public places, and solicits abnormal sexual practices. Such conduct would not amount to crime against nature, 0
but will come within Subdivision (4) of the obscenity article.
Resisting an officer is a misdemeanor which includes all forms
of resistance of an officer who is making a lawful arrest or seizure
of property, or is serving any lawful process. It is essential that
the offender know, or at least have knowledge of facts giving him
reason to know, that such officer is acting in his official capacity.
The more serious offense of escape is divided into aggravated
183. La. Act 286 of 1938, § 3, 'Rule 18 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5223].
184. La. Crim. Code, Art. 101.
185. La. Crim. Code, Art. 102.
186. La. Crim. Code, Art. 103.
187. La. Crim. Code, Art. 104 (keeping a disorderly place), and Art. 105
(letting a disorderly place).
188. La. Crim. Code, Art. 104.
189. La. Crim. Code, Art. 106. Mere solicitation has generally been held
insufficient to constitute an attempt.
190. La. Crim. Code, Art. 108.
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escape"" and simple escape,'9 2 with danger to human life serving
as the distinguishing factor. The additional prison term, which
may be imposed for escape or attempted escape, is not to run
concurrently with the offender's existing sentence. Assisting escape ' is committed by any public officer who intentionally permits the escape of a prisoner in his custody, or by anyone who
actively assists in an escape or attempted escape.
Offenses Affecting Organized Government
The treason9 4 and flag desecration 95 articles are simply a
restatement, in a somewhat more concise form, of the existing
Louisiana statutes. A misprision of treason article' 96 has been
added to provide punishment for the individual who knows of
treasonous activities and fails to notify the proper authorities.
Criminal anarchy19 7 is the advocating, teaching, or belonging to a
society known to advocate any doctrine which contemplates
crime, violence or terrorism as a means of effecting governmental
change. Such activities may fall short of treason, but they are
nevertheless very dangerous in times like these. A 1918 statute 8
punishing abusive and disloyal language when the United States
is at war was expressly retained. A special sabotage statute and
a number of other emergency criminal laws were also enacted
by the 1942 legislature. 19 9 These statutes, being special war-time
legislation, are not included in the Code.
200
Existing bribery statutes were numerous and confusing.
The new Code correlates and combines all these various special
statutes in one general article on public bribery,'20 which embraces the bribery of public officers or employees,' 0 ' election officials, jurors, and witnesses. Upon a suggestion of the Advisers,
191. La. Crim. Code, Art. 109.
192. La. Crim. Code, Art. 110.
193. La. Crim. Code, Art. 111.
194. La. Crim. Code, Art. 113.
195. La. Crim. Code, Arts. 116, 117.
196. La. Crim. Code, Art. 114.
197. La. Crim. Code, Art. 115.
198. La. Act 138 of 1918, §§ 1, 2 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 1188, 1189].
199. La. Acts 24-26 of 1942 (sabotage); and La. Act 242 of 1942 (disloyal
teachings and utterances).
200. A general bribery statute was passed in 1878 (La. Act 59 of 1878
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 788-795)), and then a similar statute was enacted
in 1890 (La. Act 78 of 1890 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 796-798]). The Louisiana
courts have held that the 1890 statute only effected a partial repeal of the
prior statute. State v. Desforges, 48 La. Ann. 73, 18 So. 912 (1896).
201. La. Crim. Code, Art. 118.
202. The terms "public officer" and "public employee" are defined In
Article 2 of the Code. In applying to "public employees," the new article
enlarges the scope of the offense.
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bribery of voters203 was made a separate and lesser offense. Bribery is defined to include the giving or receiving, and also the
promising or soliciting, of a bribe. The intent element of the offense is simply stated. It is enough that the bribe was given or
offered "with the intent to influence his [the recipient's] conduct
in relation to his position, employment, or duty." The action induced need not be corrupt or illegal. The buying or selling of
appointments to office, or extra payments to induce a public
officer or employee to do what he is already legally bound to do,
20 4
would clearly constitute public bribery.
20 5
Public intimidation
includes the same parties and requires
the same intention as public bribery. The principal distinction
between the two offenses is the method employed to accomplish
that purpose. The phrase "violence, force, or threats" is broad
enough to include threats of injury to character as well as threats
of physical violence.
The public bribery and public intimidation articles are supplemented by two special articles which cover a related type of
improper conduct particularly affecting jurors. Any attempt to
influence jurors in respect to their verdict, except in the regular
course of the trial, will constitute jury tampering;2° while any
juror who intentionally permits such undue influencing or pledges
207
his verdict will be guilty of jury misconduct.
Existing perjury and false swearing statutes were very inadequate and did not provide a complete definition of those offenses. While the former perjury statute was limited to false
swearing in judicial proceedings, 208 the new perjury article 20 9 has
extended the offense so as to include false oaths in any proceeding
before a board or official authorized to take testimony. Such administrative hearings are often fully as important, and perjury
therein fully as anti-social, as in judicial proceedings. The crime
is fully defined and it is specifically required that the statement
must be material, and that the offender must have knowledge of
its falsity. A more severe maximum penalty is provided for the
commission of perjury at a felony trial. The lesser offense of

203. La. Crim. Code, Art. 119.
204. People v. Furlong, 125 N.Y. Supp. 164, 140 App. Div. 179
Daniel v. United States, 17 F.(2d) 339 (C.C.A. 9th, 1927).

(1910);

205. La. Crim. Code, Art. 122. It is even broader than the public bribery
article and includes intimidation of voters.
206. La. Crim. Code, Art. 129.

207. La. Crim. Code, Art. 130.
208..La. Act 18 of 1888 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1093].
209. La. Crim. Code, Art. 123.
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2 10 is committed by the making of a false extrafalse swearing
2

judicial oath, provided that such oath is "required by law." '

Often conflicting statements are made under oath, as before the
grand jury and upon the actual criminal trial. Such changing of
testimony by a key witness (for reasons which are usually impossible of proof) may often wreck the most carefully and honestly prepared case. One of the statements is bound to be false,
and yet it is very difficult for the prosecution to specifically prove
which statement is false. Special articles21 2 have been inserted,
patterned after a similar 1932 Louisiana statute of more limited
scope,213 which establish prima facie liability for perjury or false

swearing by the fact of inconsistent statements. In cases of honest
forgetting it will be an affirmative defense (burden of proof on
the accused) that "at the time he made them, the accused honestly believed both statements to be true."
A number of miscellaneous offenses in Title VII deserve
passing mention. Compounding a felony214 is committed when any
person agrees, upon a consideration, not to prosecute or reveal the
commission of a crime. Injuring public records21 covers the de-,
struction, mutilation or alteration of public records. To be the
subject of this offense the document must have been filed or
deposited "by authority of law." This crime is supplemented by
that of filing false public records21 6 which is committed by the
original filing of a false or forged document for record. A general
malfeasance in office article2 1 7 is substantially copied from the
existing Louisiana statute,218 but is broader in that it includes
malfeasance of public. employees as well as of public officers.
The concluding articles of the Code set out the "political"
offenses and are designed to deter and prevent various undesirable or corrupt practices by state officials and employees. The
crimes of public salary deduction2 1

9

and public salary extortion2 2 0

prohibit the so-called "deducts" and "contributions" which provide funds to grease the political machine at the expense of the
small employees. Dual office holding22' is an offense which can
210. La. Crim. Code, Art. 125.

211. Accord: State v. Parrish, 129 La. 547, 56 So. 503 (1911).
212. La. Crim. Code, Arts. 124, 126.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

La.
La.
La.
La.
La.
La.
La.

Act 210 of 1932, § 2 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 1096].
Crim. Code, Art. 131.
Crim. Code, Art. 132.
Crim. Code, Art. 133.
Crim. Code, Art. 134.
Act 254 of 1912, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 801].
Crim. Code, Art. 135.

220. La. Crim. Code, Art. 136.
221. La. Crim. Code, Art. 137.
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never be defined to the satisfaction of everyone, as was indicated
by the number of special dual office holding bills proposed and
hotly debated in the 1942 legislature. Rather than launch perilously into this uncharted sea, the new article is a substantial reenactment of a 1940 statute which had been drafted and recommended by the Louisiana State Law Institute after a careful consideration of all of the conflicting issues involved.2 22 The public
payroll fraud article2 2 1 is simply a rewriting of the 1940 "deadhead" statute, 22 in a form consistent with the other articles of the
Code. Similarly, political payroll padding2 5 is based upon a 1940
statute 226 making it criminal to increase public payrolls and expenditures during the six months immediately preceding any
gubernatorial election date. The clause providing for an exception
in case of public emergency has been slightly altered so as to
make it clear that the increased payroll or expenditure must be
:'necessitated by" such emergency. The old public contract fraud
statute 227 was so worded as to apparently make the mere fact that
a public officer had an interest in a public contract sufficient for
criminal liability. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court had
recently held that this statute was only applicable where the
officer voted for or did some other affirmative act in order to
secure the awarding of a public contract to himself or the firm in
which he was interested. The new article expressly codifies that
limitation, and makes an affirmative act or influencing the gravamen of the offense. While the mere existence of an interest will
not be per se criminal, it will constitute "presumptive evidence"
of the use of official influence.
CONCLUSION

The new "Louisiana Criminal Code," with its direct and
simple language, will be a real help to the younger lawyer. The
experienced practitioner, who has a natural reluctance toward a
new system of criminal law, will be agreeably surprised to find
222. See Special Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the
Legislature of Louisiana Recommending Certain Criminal Statutes (May,
1940) 8, 9. The statute (La. Act 259 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§
7789.2-7789.5]) is discussed in Bugea, Lazarus, and Pegues, Louisiana Legislation of 1940 (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 98, 149.
223. La. Crim. Code, Art. 138.
224. La. Act 63 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 7773.1-7773.7].
225. La. Crim. Code, Art. 139.
226. La. Act 9 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 2788.6-2788.9].
227. La. Act 128 of 1906 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 805, 806].
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that many of his old landmarks and beacons still remain. However, a considerable amount of redefinition and rearrangement
has been necessary in order to eliminate the overlapping and
confusion of the old patch-upon-patch system of criminal law.
Also a number of the obtuse fictions and purposeless distinctions
of the common law of crimes have been eliminated. The Reporters' Comments, published with the Code,22 8 explain the articles
and should greatly facilitate an adjustment to the new law. These
comments point out the nature of and reason for changes made,
and also indicate the intended scope and meaning of the language
employed. A comprehensive index, including both the old and
new terminology, should be of real assistance to those using the
Code.2 9 The repealing '30 and saving 21 clauses have been carefully
worked out, and enumerate the statutes affected in chronological
order. This simplifies the task of the lawyer who seeks to ascertain
whether a particular statute is repealed or preserved.
A discussion of the Criminal Code would be incomplete without brief mention of a companion statute,2' 3 2 also prepared by the
Louisiana State Law Institute, which serves to correlate the new
substantive criminal law and the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure. Numerous changes in the various crimes and criminal terminology necessitated a careful re-examination and amendment of
the procedural rules, to the end that the language employed
might be consistent. Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
has been amended so that the enumeration of crimes excepted
from the one year prescription period includes the most serious
offenses under the new Criminal Code.2 38 The short forms of in228. Publication of these comments was pursuant to Senate Concurrent
Resolution 12 of 1942.
229. This index was carefully prepared by Mr. Albert S. Lutz, who had
worked as a research assistant and contributed largely to the preparation of
the Criminal Code.
230. La. Act 43 of 1942, § 2.
231. La. Act 43 of 1942, § 3.
232. La. Act 147 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 8737].
233. The old offenses have all been included, with the exception of counterfeiting, which is solely a federal offense, and is not punishable under the
Louisiana Criminal Code. Rape, arson, and robbery have been graded, so only
the most serious grade is included. The crimes added to the list of exceptions
are aggravated kidnapping, burglary in the nighttime, burglary in the daytime, and treason.
Act 323 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 8577], enacted in the same
session, amended Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by reducing
the time within which a district attorney must nolle prosequi or prosecute,
after indictment or information for a felony, from six to three years. A similar provision was also inserted in the procedure bill accompanying the
Criminal Code. Construing these two amendments to Article 8 together, the
special amendatory statute with the old enumeration of exceptions will apply
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dictment have been re-drafted to conform with the changed
names and nature of certain offenses. Article 13 has been amended
so as to provide a liberal venue rule, applicable in all criminal
prosecutions. 23 4 Less significant modifications of other procedural
articles serve to dovetail them with the new substantive law of
23 5

crimes.

The Louisiana Criminal Code represents the combined work
and thought of judges, district attorneys, criminal law practitioners and law teachers. The important nature of the Louisiana
State Law Institute's accomplishment can best be understood
when one reviews previous futile efforts at codification in this
state and considers similar unsuccessful efforts in other jurisdictions. Some penal theorists will urge that the changes made were
not sweeping enough. Old school practitioners may decry the new
legislation as too radical. The existence of such objections is a
rather convincing testimonial to the fact that the new Code has
effected a fair and practical compromise of these two divergent
interests. Such a compromise was essential if the Code was to
become a reality. Some of the Reporters' pet theories fell in the
process, but only after careful consideration, and usually in the
interest of producing a code which would stand a substantial
chance of actual enactment. In a number of instances the articles
were considerably improved by the Council's deliberations and
suggestions. The rape articles, much debated from both legal and
to indictments for crimes committed prior to the effective date of the Criminal Code, while the provision in the general amendatory statute will be
applicable to indictments for crimes subsequently committed.
234. La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, Art. 235.
235. Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was simply a restate-

ment of the venue provision in the Louisiana Constitution (Art. I, § .9) that
the trial for a crime must take place in the parish where the offense was
committed. As long as an offense was completed within A single parish, this

rule presented little difficulty. However, an offense is often begun in one
parish, partly executed in another, and completed in a third. In such cases,
the district attorney (and ultimately the court) had a very difficult time in
selecting the parish where the crime was committed. The recent cases of
State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940); State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So.
523 (1940); and numerous other complex and difficult venue situations pre-

sented during the 1939-1940 term of the Louisiana Supreme Court, served to
focus attention upon the problem. In a number of recent criminal statutes,
the legislature had Inserted special liberal venue provisions. Rather than to
insert special venue provisions in the various articles of the Code where the
problem may be troublesome, Article 13 was rewritten so as to specifically
authorize trial In the parish where any element of an offense was committed,
although the crime may have been continued or completed elsewhere. An

examination of the decisions In other states with constitutional provisions
identical to Art. I, § 9, of the Louisiana Constitution, reveals the fact that
statutes similar to the amended Article 13 have been uniformly upheld. For
a full collection and analysis of these decisions, see Comment by Litton
(1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 321.
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social viewpoints, present a good illustration of such improvement. Undoubtedly, there. are many points in which the new
Criminal Code, either because of practical considerations or lack
of perspective, does 'not achieve perfection. Yet, the significant
fact remains that by the enactment of this Code the Louisiana legislature has taken a very substantial step forward in the field of
criminal law.
The future value of the new Criminal Code, and the efficacy
of the improvements made, now depends very largely upon a
sympathetic and understanding interpretation by the Louisiana
courts. In this regard the legislative mandate of Article 3 becomes
especially significant: "in order to promote justice and to effect
the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction according to the fair import of their words,
taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and
with reference to the purpose of the provision." It is important
that our courts shall not permit the fine spun disquisitions and
fictions of the common law to creep back in, as has been the case
in a number of states where legislatures sought to modernize and
236
improve the criminal law.
236. Summary of other Amendments to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure:
Art. 35 (detention of witnesses-proces verbal of inquest). "Negligent
homicide" has been added. The coroner's power fo detain or order the detention of witnesses thus covers all homicides.
Art. 36 (arrest of accused by coroner). Again the new offense of "negligent homicide" has been added to the enumeration.
Art. 42 (search warrants for stolen property). A slight re-wording was
necessitated by the fact that the crimes presently designated as larceny,
embezzlement and obtaining by false pretenses have been combined in the
crime of "Theft."
Art. 43 (situations where search warrants may be issued). In subdivision
(3) the word "gaming" has been changed to "gambling" which is the term
used in the new Criminal Code. Subdivision (1) has been deleted in view of
the fact that counterfeiting is not a state offense under the new Criminal
Code.
Art. 48 (seized property-custody-return to owner). This article has been
slightly altered so as to adapt it to the "Theft" article.
Art. 225 (several acts of theft-determination of grade of offense). This
article has been rewritten in a form which will be consistent with and supplement the provision in the "Theft" article for aggregating the amounts
misappropriated or taken to determine the grade of the offense.
Art. 230 (naming of injured person). The only change was a substitution
of "battery" for "wounding" in the enumeration of illustrative offenses.
Art. 234 (immaterial averments and omissions). The only change is to
delete "feloniously" and insert "intentionally," which is the word used in the
Criminal Code to mean general criminal intent. See Article 10 of the Criminal
Code.
Art. 236 (description of written instrument in indictment). This article
was redrafted In order to correlate it with the Criminal Code offenses. The
phrase "written instrument" has been substituted for the broader and possibly ambiguous word "instrument." Also the last clause which states that
the value of the instrument need not be described has been deleted. In case

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. V

of "Theft" it is essential that a value be placed upon the property misappropriated in order to determine the grade of the offense.
Art. 238 (aiders and abetters-indictment as principals) Repealed. This
article had been superseded by Louisiana Act 120 of 1932. Both of these are
expressly set out in the repealing clause of the Criminal Code, since the
subject matter is covered by Article 24 of the new Criminal Code (principals).
Art. 245 (indictment for theft). This article has been redrafted so that
it will be applicable to the crime of "Theft," which combines those offenses
which were originally designated separately as larceny, embezzlement and
obtaining by false pretenses.
Art. 246 (theft-charges in indictment). The changes made serve to accomplish the end sought by the original article and to adapt it to the new
offenses set out in the Criminal Code.
Art. 247 (indictment for defamation). This article is rephrased slightly
so as to apply to the crime of "defamation," which combines the former
separate offenses of libel and slander.
Art. 248 (indictment for murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide).
The similar offense of negligent homicide has been included. Also the last
sentence merely re-affirms a right to use the short forms prescribed in Article
235, rather than to repeat those forms of indictment.
Art. 250 (indictment for perjury or false swearing). The words "subornation of perjury" have been eliminated since the Criminal Code contains
no such offense.
Arts. 362-363 (influencing and shadowing of jurors) Repealed. Articles 118,
122, and 129 of the new Criminal Code cover attempts to influence jurors.
These matters were clearly substantive criminal law, rather than criminal
procedure.
Art. 386 (judges' charge to jury on responsive verdicts). "Negligent homicide" has been added to the list of verdicts of lesser offenses which are
responsive to a murder indictment. This is in accord with the purpose of
Article 29 of the Criminal Code which specifically designates murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide as different degrees of homicide.
Art. 407 (larceny, embezzlement, obtaining by false pretenses-responsive
verdicts) Repealed. This article is rendered obsolete by combination of the
formerly separate offenses of larceny, embezzlement, obtaining by false Pretenses and swindling in the crime of "Theft."
Art. 431 (embezzlement by public officer). The word "embezzlement" has
been changed to "Theft," in conformity with Article 67 of the Criminal Code.
Art. 443 (defamation-admissibility of truth in evidence). The new term
"defamation" is substituted for the word "libel." Under the new Criminal
Code, the truth of non-privileged defamatory statements is very material. If
the publication or expression is true, actual malice must be proved in order
to convict the offender.
Art. 468 (bribery-incriminating testimony). The article has been amended
so as to enumerate the various kinds of bribery set out in the new Criminal
Code.
La. Act 57 of 1940 (charging the crimes of stealing, embezzlement, obtaining by false pretenses, and swindling, and grading of said offenses) Repealed.
In view of the "Theft" article of the Criminal Code and the amendment and
re-enactment of Article 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this statute
is no longer necessary.

